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CHAPTOR I
PRBLIMIHAR? CONSIDBRATIONS
Exactly what should be the relationship between CSiurch
and State has been a moot question since long before the
adoption of the First Amendment to the Constitution. Like
wise* since that time� many controversies have arisen con
cerning Its real meaning. It was, therefore, not surprising
that great debates and violent disagreements ensued when
the United States Supreme Court on June 23, 1962, decided
against the uasage of prayer in the New York Schools. This
prayer, composed by an agency of the New Yoz�k State govern
ment, is as follows:
"Almighty Ok>d, we acknowledge our dependence upon
dee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents,
our teachers and our country. *
I. HISTORICAL BACKOROUND
The New York State Board of Regents, which has
charge of the New York public school system, created this
non-sectarian prayer and recommended it to the school
boards, though "the Regents left the decision on whether
to use the prayer with the individual school boards. "2
^Bngel, et al., v. VItale, et al.. No. 468 U.S. October
term (19b27 P. T7
^David D. Field, "Chureh-State Separation: A
Serpentine Wall?" Christ ianity Today, 6j29-31� July 20, 1962.
2The school board of Mew Hyde Paz4c, Long Island, voted
to use the prayer, as did most other school boards In the
state. Thus each day the children In every classroom In
the district recited the Regents ' prayer as a devotional
exercise. After a short time, five parents brought action
against the school board In a New York State Court on the
grounds that the Board of Regents had no right to compose a
prayer for use in the public schools. This, they declared,
was tantamount to establishing a religion, which is uncon
stitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, and made applicable to the states by the
Foux*teenth Amendment. The case, which takes its name from
Steven I. Sngel, one of the parents, and William J. Vitale,
Jr., one of the school board members, was decided against
the parenta by this court, by the Mew York Court of
Appeals, and by the New Yoz4c Supreme Court. (B. 1A2).
The prlmazT' reason that these courts upheld the Board of
Regents was that no one was obligated to repeat the prayer,
for anyone who so desired, could reaain quiet, or even
leave the room; and no coiraient was penaitted to be made
either by the teachers or the other students. These
parents, however, declared that the prayer was against their
religious convictions, for of the five, two were Jewish, one
belongs to the Sthlcal Culture Society, one Is a Unitarian,
and one Is a non-believer. 3 Even they, however, did not
force their children to leave the room while the prayer
was being said, for they did not wish to have them labled
"pariahs." Through a Writ of Certiorari the S��>reme Court
reviewed the case, with the well-known result that they
reversed the findings of the lower courts on the grounds
that the New Toz^ Soard of Begents had established "the
religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer," (B. 8)
in violation of the Establishment Clause of the Wirat
Amendment. The significant points of the decision are these
(l) the prayer was drafted by state officials for general
use in schools, (2) it was incontestably religious in
nature, and (3) it was read every day in class rooms by
pupils and teachers together, though students could be
excused fr^ participating at the risk of labeling themselve
non-conformists.^ The reaction, immediate and violent, was
not conditioned solely by this decision, for It followed Xn
the wake of a number of unpopular decisions. In fact, on
the same day that this decision was handed down, two other
unpopular decisions were given�one allowing homosexuals to
use the United States malls to send out their magazines
3 Ibid.
^The New York Times, June 28, 1962.
4containing pictupos of nud� males, and another decision
which overruled a California law allowing the imprisonment
of narcotics addicts. ^
^e reactions to this slx-to-one^ vote were directed
not only at the decision Itself, but also at the members
of the Court personally. The next day in both houses of
Congress, bills were Introduced to amend the Constitution
and override the decision. Habere of both parties took
the floor to denounce the Court, often vilifying the
Justices personally.^ Southern Congressmen took the
opportunity to suggest that "the prayar ruling only showed
how equally wrong the court had been to outlaw segregation
in publlo schools. "8 niose honorable gentlemen were not
alone in their objections, however, among politicians.
Sx-Prssidents Hoover and Eisenhower disagreed with the
decision, though they were able to do so without casting
any aspersions on the Court. At President Kennedy's next
press conference following the decision, the very first
question asked him was ooncemiag hisi4.ews on the matter.
5Held, loc. clt.
^Justices Frankfurter and White abstained. Justice
Stewart dissented.
7The Mew York Times, June 27, 1962, p. 1.
8 Ibid., July 1, 1962, p. 10.
Bis answer has been considered classic:
We have in this case a very easy remedy, and that
is to pray ourselves. And I would think that it
would be a welcome reminder to every American family
that we can pray a good deal more at home, we can
atter^ our churches with a good deal more fidelity,
and we can make the true meaning of praatr much more
inq^oil^ant in the lives of our children.^
One week after the decision, the Qovemors' Conference met
in Hershey, Pennsylvania. Here a debate ensued over the
desirability of suggesting an amendment to Congress. So
inq;>ortant was this issue considered to be that the con
ference rules had to be amended before it eould be
discussed, for the topic had not been submitted in
advance of the conference.-^�
Of greater interest to the purposes of this paper,
however, were the reactions among the religious leaders
of the nation. Francis Cardinal Spellman, renowned leader
in the Roman Catholic faith* termed the deeision, " . . .
a tragic misreading of the prayex^ully weighed words of
our foimdlng fathers. ""''^ The Catholic Church in general
has taken a stand disagreeing with the decision. Bishop
7red P. Corson, Methodist leader, said the ruling "makes
secularism the national religion. "^2 l^iscopal Bishop
9lbld.. June 28, 1962, p. 1. ^Olbid., July 4, 1962
l^Ibld , June 28, 1962, p. 17 l^Ibid.
6James A. Pike, who Is also a qxiallfled lawyer and a member
of the bar of the United States Supreme Court, Is one of the
most outspoken Protestants against the decision. He protests,
"with us, separation of church and state was never Intended
to mean separation of religion from society. "^3 Protestants
In general are not \manlmovisly either for or against the
decision. In fact, they are almost equally divided. Even
within denominations, there Is often a lack of agreement.
In a poll of Methodist bishops, for Instance, the reactions
were split, some favoring the decision strongly on the basis
of preservation of the principle of Church-State separation;
and others virtually condemning It for fear It outlawed
prayer altogether, or It violated principles of religious
freedom. Mot a few were unsure of i^t the decision actually
meant. 1^ With some exceptions the majority of the Jewish
membere of society favor the decision. A typical Jewish
attitude Is that of the Reverend Doctor Edward B. Klein,
Rabbi of the Stephen Wise Free Synagogue of Mew Yoxic:
Critics of the Supreme Court's decision have been
unduly fearful that it is a victory for secularism.
On the contrary, i". augttrs well not only for the
future of democracy but also for the future of reli
gion In the United States.-'^3
13ibld., July 14, 1962, p. 9.
l^"Bishops Mot Excited Over Decision," Christian
Advocate, 4:23-24, July 14, I962.
15The Mew York Times, July 1, I962, p. 48.
7For the most part, by the end of Aiigust, the
impassioned popular reaction to the decision had given
way to more sober, scholarly, though equally controversial
speculation. Doctor Reinhold Niebuhr sums up the popular
reaction very well with these words:
This reaction reveals that symbols, rather than facts*
were involved as they so frequently are in both
religious and political controversies. The Regents'
prayer was a symbol of the religious life and tradition
of the nation. The court deoisimi symbolises to some
rellgious^people the perils of secularisation of our
culture .
Another more humorous way of expressing the popular feeling
is given in the little poem published in the San Francisco
Monitor:
A Child's Prayer-''^
Mow I lay me down to sleep;
I pray the State ray soul to keep.
If I should die before I wake,
I hope the Court made no mistake.
The popular reaction^ for all Its passion, is basic to any
onsideration of the decision, for basically what the
popular mind is asking, is the same thing the trained obser
vers' are asking
l^Reinhold Niebuhr. "The Regents' Pnqrer Decision, "
Christianity and Crisis, 22:125-26, July 23, 1962.
17a8 cited 1ft America, 107:494, July 14, 1962.
II. THE PROBLEM
8
Statement of the problem The questions being raised
among those ::oncemed are: First, what does the decision
actually sayj and second, what does It mean? Even among
scholaxv there have been such questions.
But there was also during the first week the
beginning of that kind of Supreme Court criticism that
ought Ideally to r;' se above bias and politics� the
criticism of scholars. And here, characteristically,
the doubts one heard were less about tlie result reached
by the court than about its reasming� in the opinion
of Justice Hugo L Black for the majority. . . . When
one sought precise, pin-pointed reasons for the holding
that this prayer was a violation of the Constitution
they were not so easy to find.^"
Piirpoae or the s^feudy It is, therefore, the purpose
of this study to analyse the decision in an effort to
understand what the participating Justlses have said; and
then, to try to comprehend the implications of their
statements After determining what was said and what was
meant, this study intends to consider the precedents
established and the possible directions In irtiich these might
lead
The Importance of the study. Th&t the decision had
far-reaching iaqplications is evident not only from the
reaction to it when it first was published, but also Trom
iQrhe Mew Yoric Times, July 1, 1962, p. 10 (Sec. IV.)
9the high Interest it has naint&lned since the original reaction.
The fact that a number of articles�both pro and con�are
still being written In magaslnes Is Indicative of the fact
that the problem Is not yet dead. A far better Indication
of the seriousness of the problem even at the time of writing,
is the nimtber of cases of a similar nature on the Supreme
Court docket�at least three, and possibly more. Not only
so, but there is every indication that more cases will be
pushed throxjgh the lower courts as rapidly as possible in
an effort to bring them to the Supreme Court for adjudication.
John deJ Pemberton, Jr , e3i�cutive director of the American
Civil Liberties Itaion, which helped finance the fight against
the New YoiHte prayer, said:
We are confident that iriien other more sectarian
religious practices are brought to the Court's
attention, they likewise will be declared unconsti
tutional Among these are Christmas and Chanukah
observances, Bible reading, recitation of the Lord's
Prayer, and baccalaureate services . �'�9
When the Supreme Court delivers verdicts upon all of these
cases, and if those verdicts are again contrary to the
popular desires, there is evidence that the reaction could
be more severe than that following the Regents' prayer
decision. The American Jewish Committee observed this fact
through a survey of newspaper editorials dealing with the
��^^"l^roar Over School Prayer," U.S. Ifews, 53:42-44,
July 9, 1962
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prayer decision. The survey showed that the editors were
generally critical of the decision, but few were bitter or
extrene. The report on the survey states:
It is considered likely that any attempt to extend
the range of the decision's application would result
in increased and less moderate opposition. . . .
A good part of the editorials took the stand that
there is no need for any action to reverse the decision�
and will not be- -unless there is a future inclination
by the Supreme Oourt to extend its scope "'^^^
As Indicated above, many steps were taken attempting to
counter the Regents* prayer decision Some of these were
Insufficient, others went too far, wid still others missed
the point altogether Bverything fr<� a Congressional
resolution to a constitutional amendment was suggested. There
was a great deal of confusion, which fact was due primarily
to the lack of tmderstandlng of what was said and meant in
the decision. Before other decisions are handed down in
further cemplicatltm of the pr^lem, and definitely before
any definitive action taken, these misunderstandings must
be clarified . This is the reason that such a study as this
is im{K}rtant at this time.
yhf limitations of the study. In order to appreciate
fully the meaning of this decision, it should be studied in
the light of previous cases of a similar nature. The
2*^rls Smolor, "The Press and the Prayer," The
Amerloan Examiner, July, 1968- (Italics not in the original.)
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complete lee�l histories of related cases would shed
vftluahle ll#it upon this case. Tn addition, a thorough
study of the proposals made to counter the decision would
be of invaluable aid to the consideration of the meaning of
the decision to contes^rary society. Such thorough hand
ling of the subject, however desirable, is unforttinately
beyond the S'-ope of this work, for this study seeks only
to examine and to analyse the three documents Involved in the
decision; 1 e^ , the Majority Opinion delivered by Mr.
Justice Black, the Concurring Opinion of Mr, Justice Douglas,
and the ixa senting Opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart To do
this, it may be argued, is to take the dociroents out of
their historical context, but this need not invalidate the
study, for a sufficient context is Included within the texts
of the opinions to warrant the approach taken here. Further
study fr<�i the approaches mentioned above, would nonetheless
be a definite aid to a fuller tenders tanding of the decision
in question.
III. PROCEDURES OF RESEARCH
In addition to the official transcript of the decision
obtained fr<�ii the Supreme Court, the matez>lals t^ed in this
study are restricted almost c^pletely to the periodical
type of literature The reason for this is the limited
amount of time which has elapsed between the giving of the
12
decision and the writing of this study, which lack of time
has not peiroltted the publication of any books on this
precise decision. Research began with The New York Times
newspaper. Through the aid of The New York Times Index and
micro-film, nearly fifty articles, editorials and letters
to t^e editor dealing with the decision were read care
fully in that newspaper. These gave a thorough back
ground and Introduction to the case, the decision, and the
popular reaction. Other newspapers used. Include The
(airistlan Science Monitor and The American Examiner, a
Jewish publication. From this point, study in magazine
articles was made. A total of nearly one hundred articles
were read, representing all schools of thought. Such nation
wide publications as Life, U.S. Mews, Time, and Newsweek and
others^-'- were used. Various publications of religious
organizations were used extensively, such as the Jewish
newspaper. The Ameirican Bxamlner, mentioned above; and
Roraan Catholic publications such as America and Coimnonweal.
The major theological positions of Protestantism were
studied carefTilly. The Liberal position was expressed quite
clearly in Christian Century and other magazines] Neo-
Olythodoxy was strongly represented In Reinhold Niebuhr' s
publication, Christianity and Crisis i and The Conservative
Slgee Bibliography for a more complete list of sources.
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position tecaaie oloar in the fortnightly magaxine, Christi
anity Today. Publioationa by both the national Cotinoll of
Churches and the National Association of Evangelicals were
also studied. Most of the major denominations. Including
Methodist, Presbyterian, Protestant l^lsoopal, Mazarene,
Salvation Army, and others, made statements in their
official organs which are highly Indicative of the positions
of those churches- -though it Is necessary to note that the
statements of any magazine in a Protestant denomination
may not necessarily be applicable to all its constituents.
Only after much thorough study was it deemed advisable to
turn to the analysis of the docvraents themselves. Each
document had been read before, of course, but only for
content. Now they were read orltleally, with the purposes
of this study fimly in mind. Once this was done, the
a&terlal oo\ild be organized according to the outline and
writing could begin.
The outliiM of the baalo organization of this thesis
is rather simple, with one chapter being devoted to Intro-
duetory materials, three chapters devoted to each of the
respective doovments of the decision, and one chapter
devoted to sunoaary and conclusions.
Each document is discussed thorotaghly, point by point,
in each chapter. Each subdivision is discussed from the
standpoint of what it says and of what it actually means,
and oonolusions drawn, before the study moves on to the
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next point. Thus, to aid the reader to keep a coherent
unity of perspective. It Is strongly suggested that each
document be read In Its entirety before reading the dlaoussion
about it. The reader may also find it helpful to turn to the
transcript from time to time throughout the discussion.
Bach of the three chapters dealing with the three documents
will be divided into two very unequal sections. The first,
or "Study" section, wUl deal with the discussion of the
doouaent itaelf . TtM second, or "Svaluation" section, will
deal with certain values and crltici�&s of the docvoaent as
a whole, or of its effects.
For the sake of brevity, this thesis will use the
following abbreviations in altlng the reference i B. plus
a niaaber from one through fifteen will refer to the Majority
Opinion delivered by Mr. Justice j|Iaok, the number referring
to the page in the official tx�naertpt appezuted to this
thesiai D. plus a numiber from one through nine will refer to
the Concurring Opinion wzdtten by Mr. Justice ficuglas with
the nuBiber referring to the page; and S. plus a number will
refer to the Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice ^tewart, which
is a document six pages in length, tftiless othemlse indicated,
the term "decision" will be used generally, inoliiding all
three opinions delivered. Tha concluding chapter of this
study will have three subdivisions t (l) Frecedents; (2) Sug
gestions or a stwly of various suggestions made to counter ttie
decision; and (3) Conclusions of the researcher.
CHAPTER II
AHALYSIS or THE MAJORITY OPINION
�nirovighout the country about 20 per cent of all
schools practice a morning devotional, usually In the
form of the Lord's Prayer. Between 40 and 50 per cent
of all schools hold Bible raadlng sessions, and about
one-fifth of the nation's 35,000 school districts
require teaching about raligion, usually without
sectarian emphasis.'''
To what extent have these practices been outlawed by the
Regents' prayer decision of the Supreme Court? Some
answer that they have been abolished altogether. Others
deny this, saying that they have not been at all affected.
Still others agree that though this decision did not abolish
such devotional periods as these from the schools, a pra-
cedent has been established whereby cases can be won which
will do so. Thus, a lack of unanimity of opinion exists
not only in tAiat the decision means, but even to a signifi
cant extent in what it says. It is the purpose of this
chapter to study what the decision sayS and means and to
make an evaluation of it.
I. STUDY
The Majority Opinion la a well-written document in
simple, non- technical language. The ideas are expressed well
^The New Yoi^ Times, July 1, 1962. p. 1. (Sec. IV.)
and the logic Is quite clear and easy to follow, though
It seems true, that precise, pin-pointed reasons for de
claring the prayer to be unconstitutional were not easy to
find. 2 There is evidence of a great deal of research, and
as is to be expected, an excellent grasp of the legal aspects
of this and related cases and of pertinent legislation on
both state and federal levels. A clear outline is not
indicated and must be extracted somewhat arbitrarily. For
the purpose of study in this thesis, the document has been
outlined as follows: 3
INTRODUCTION 3
I. The Decision Itself 3- ^
II. History of Religious Establishments. . . 4-7
III. Ttie First Constitutional Amendment . . . 7-15
A. Reasons for its adoption 7- 8
B. Interpretation
C. Application to the prayer 12-15
CONCLUSION 15
This outline will be used as the basis for study throughout
the remainder of this chapter.
^The !tew York Times, July 1, 1962, p. 10. (See page
7 above. )
3page numbers refer to those in the official tran
script appended to this thesis.
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Introduotlon (B. 1-3)
The opening paragraph of the document is devoted to
a brief history of the case. This background information
is important to the course of the discussion and to the choice
of words used. There are three very basic considerations
given: (l) the Intent of the Board of Regents, (2) the
Objections of the Parents, and (3) the Lower Court Decisions.
The Intent of the Board of Regents. The reasoning
of the Hew York State Board of Regents in writing this prayer
is well presented in the Majority (pinion:
These state officials composed the prayer which they
recommended and published as a part of their "Statement
on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools/' saying
"We believe that this Statement will be subscribed to
by all men and woown of good will, and we call upon all
of them to aid in giving life to our program." (B. 1)
The Statement is obviously intended to be of a reli
gious nature, or the word "Spiritual' would not have appeared
in it, for moralltji in Itself, is generally considered as
being teachable without undue reference to religious con
cepts and preoepts. Spirituality, however, is so intricately
bound to religion as to be almost synonymous. It is, there
fore, not a fact to be disputed, and indeed is noz disputed,
that the primary intent of the Board of Regents was religious
in giving this prayer program to the schools. The prayer
itself is the essence of the program, and the elimination
of the prayer is the automatic elimination of the entire
program.
18
The ObJectlona of the Parents. It was for this reason,
that the parents objected to the program and to the fact
that It was virtually forced upon the school children by the
local school board:
Among other things, these parents challenged the
constitutionality of both the state law authorizing theSchool District to direct the use of prayer in public
schools and the School District's regulation ordering
the recitation of this particular preyer on the ground
that these actions of official govemaentai agencies
violate that part of the Firet Amendment of the Federel
Constitution which commands that 'Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion"~a
command which was "made applicable to the State of New
Yoric by the Fourteenth Amendment of the said Constitution."
(B. 2)
fhese, of couree, were the ai^imients in court; the real
reasons for the action taken were that "use of this official
prayer in the public schools was contrary to the beliefs,
religions, or religious practices of both themselves and
their children." (B. 2) Acquaintance with the parents'
religioTis backgrounds will help one to better understand why
these objections were made.^ The important consideration
here, though, is that the objections to the prayer were
primarily religious, and the appeal against the prayer was
that it was unconstitutional because of the First Amendment.
When the case was brought to the New York Courts, it was
decided in favor of the Board of Regents and the school
board. This fact is of no mean impoz^ance to the interpre-
For a description, see pages two and three above.
19
tatlon of the Majority Opinion of the Supreme Court.
The Decision of the Lower Courts. In essential
sgreement with the lower courts which reviewed the case,
the New York Court of Appeals, "sustained an order ... to
use the Regents' preyer. . . so long as the schools did not
compel any pupil to Join In the preyer. ..." (B. 2)
The more precise wording of this decision, given in a foot
note by Justice Black, is here given in part:
It is enough . . . that regulations, such as were
adopted by New Yoric City's Board of Education im connec
tion with its released time program, be adopted, making
clear that neither teachers nor any other school authority
may comment on participation or nonpartlcipatlon in the
exercise nor suggest or require that any posture or
language be used or dress be worn or be not used or not
worn. Nonpartlcipatlon may take the form either of
remaining silent during the exercise, or if the parent
or child so desires, of being excused entirely from the
exercise. (B. 2-3)
It is interesting and pertinent to note that it is precisely
with this line of reasoning that the Majority Opinion later
takes exception. To the New York Courts, it was sufficient
that the students be excused to keep the exercise from be
coming an "establishment of religion" because the students
were believed to have been guaranteed the free exercise of
their religions by their nonpartlcipatlon.
After the brief history of the case, the Introductory
Section ends with the entry of the Supreme Court into the
case by saying quite simply, "We granted certiorari to re
view this Important decision involving rights pretected by
20
the Plrst and Pourteenth Amendments . " (B. 2-3) It Is
unfortunate that a more specific z*eason for the entry of the
Supreme Court Into the picture was not given at this point,
for there has been some criticism of the Court on the conten
tion that they did not need to enter Into the case at all.
Justice Black ml|^t well have Included here more explicit
reasons why certiorari was granted, and thus have warded off
some of the criticism which came. It Is true, however, that
he does say that certain rights protected by the First and
Vourteenth Amendments were Involved, which might be considered
all that Is necessary.
'She Decision Itself (B. 3-4)
There can, of couree, be no doubt that Hew York's pro
gram of dally classroom Invocation of Clod's blessings as
prescribed In the Regent's preyer Is a religious activity.
(B. 3)
The petitioners contend among other things that the
state laws requiring or pemlttlng vise of the Regents'
preyer must be struck down as a violation of the Estab
lishment Clause because that preyer was composed by gov
ernmental officials as a part of a governmental program
to further religious beliefs. ... We agree with that
contention since we think that the constitutional prohi
bition against laws respecting an establishment of re
ligion must at least mean that in this country it is no
part of the business of government to c<MBpOBe official
preyere for any group of the American people to recite
as a part of a religious program carried on by government.
(B. 4?
With these words. Justice Black proceeds directly to
his subject! "We think that by usi^^ its public school
21
system to encourase recitation of the Regents' prayer, the
State of New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent
with the Bstahlishment Clause." (B. 3) It must be noted that
no reference of any kind is made to any other activity of
religious nature. It is of the utmost significance that
neither here, nor elsewhere in the document, is specific
allusion made to any other practice than that ordained by the
Board of Regents, except in regard to what might be done
as a devotional activity. (B. 14, footnote #21). The reli
gious nature of the prayer is incontestible�the respondents
(in this case, the school boaiHl) and the Board of Regents
themselves admit that this is true. (B. 3) Therefore, be
cause this is a preyer written by officials of the government
of New Yoric State, and because the preyer is of an undeniably
religious nature, the parents argued that, "the State's use
of the Regents' preyer in its public school system breaches
the constitutional wall of separetion between Church and
State." (B. 4) The argument, therefore, is not with preying
in the schools as such.
It is the fact that the preyer in New Yoric 's schools
was prescribed as such by the State Government's own
school board�amd not the content of the preyer itself�
which was the basis for barring the program as uncon
stitutional . 3
3l)avid Lawrence. "Is Preyer in Schools Really Barred?"
P.a. News, 53 � 100, July 9, 1962.
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This dlffe rent ist Ion between this specific prayer, snd all
prayer In general Is obvious throughout the document. The
prayer Is objected to primarily because it was prescribed by
a governmental agency, and not because it is in itself offen
sive. This is true at least as far as the Svq;>r^e Court is
concerned, though pz-ayer Itself is quite possibly offensive
to aoms of the parents.
Discussion of this section should be treated from two
standpoints: (l) the Prayer Itself, and (2) the Decision
Itself.
Ihe Prayer Itself. Though only twenty-two words in
length, it calls upon Ood�which, though not a strictly reli-
gloiis tern in itself, in view of its vastly varying philoso
phical connotations, is most frequently used in a religious
sense�especially in prayers. More significant than this,
however, is the use of the term "Almighty Ood," a strdctly
religious concept, bearing the implications of a personal,
all-powerful Being. The phrase "we acknowledge our dependence
upon Thee," cannot be intexpreted in other than religious
terms, and not only so, but only in religious terms peculiar
to the Judeo-Christian view-point. To one whose view of Ood
is only impersonal and thus non-providential, the acknowledgosit
of personal dependence^iroxild be an entirely foreign religious
concept, and totally unacceptable. Iiikewise, to beg the
blessings of this God upon oneself, his parents, teachers, add
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ooimtry, would be equally meanlnglesa and objectionable. This
Is, of course, not to substantiate the position of the parents,
but to seek to understand It In the light of the rellgloua
precepts of the Regents' prayer to which they objected. The
religious nature of the prayer Is amply attested by the
Majority Opinion In the statement, "The nature of such a prayer
has always been religious, none of the respondents has denied
this and the trial court expressly so found ..." (B. 3)
It is, in fact, because of the religious nature of the prayer
that the great furor arose when it was declared unconstituticnal.
Many people thought that by throwing out this simple little
prayer all religion was cast out of the schools. Whether this
was Indeed the case, is the essence of the decision itself.
The Decision Itself. Though the primary objection of
the petitioners to the prayer was probably religious and per
sonal, the argumentation presented in court was that it vio
lated the Bstablishment Clause of the First Amendment.^ "For
this reason^ petitioners az^ue, the State's use of the Re
gents' preyer in its public school system breaches the con
stitutional wall of separation between Church and State."
(B. 4) In this statement, lies a great bone of contention
for those who object to the decision, for there is no mention
^See page eighteen above.
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In the Constitution anjrwhere, as Justice Stewart points out
(S. 2), of a "wall of separation." The separation of Church
and State has long been a cherished part of the American way
of life�one which only a very small minority would seek to
change. To the average Individual, however, neither complete
separation nor complete Integration, but complete co-operatl�n
Is the most desired goal. (Whether or not It Is the most
deslreble Is not the point here. It Is fair, however, to assume
that It Is the most desired goal.) Thus, to speak of a 'wall
of separetion' as does Justice Black, is to use a figure of
speech which is far too absolute for the popular mind. A
wall gives too solid a connotation, a connotation of complete
separetion with no possible room for co-operetion. A wall
is something hard and absolute, which is not thought of as
congenial, but foreboding, and to the average person, the
picture presented in the Constitution is anything but an un
congenial wall between the Church and the State. One very
good lllustretlon of the popular mind concerning this point
of view is in the letter from Aaron N. Blasbury to the editore
of America. Speaking for Orthodox Jewry against the American
Jewish Committee, he sayst
We Jews firmly believe that Ood and country are two
inseparable concepts, and we are convinced that the elim
ination of the former from the schools will also make it
lo^Bslble to toaoh love of the latter.^
Thu3> Justice Black has left room for a far broader Interpre
tation of the Majority Opinion than the document would other
wise seem to warrani; for In speaking of a sharp, unassailable
division between Church and State, Such as the figure of a
wall suggests, he presents a concept with a variety of appli
cations and possible Interpretations. This possibility for
further applications than the case in point is further man
ifest in the next sentence following, which concludes the
paragraph
. . . Ve think that the constitutional prohibition against
laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least
mean that in this country it is no part of the business
of government to compose official prayers for any group
of the American people to recite as a part of a religious
progi�m carried on by government. (B. 4)
Herein lies the gist of the entire decision, and, ^taken at
face value, must be admitted as true. One significant phrese,
however, forbids a strictly literal interpretation and lends
Itself to a broader interpretation than simply the disallowance
of govemmentally composed prayers�the vezy least possible
interpretation of the decision. This significant phrase is
the tiny, seemingly unimportant phrase "at least" in the
second line above. These two common words change the meaning
of the entire decision, for without this phrase the only
7 "Letters About an Editorial," America, 107t774-79>
September 22, 1962.
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possible interpretation would be that only this one prayer is
found to be in violation of the Pirst Amendment. On the
other hand, with the phrase included as it is, the decision
mean, "dough there are other (here unmentioned) restric
tions placed upon goveniment by this Amendment, the very
basic minimum restriction is that it has no business writing
prayers." Thus the entire meaning of the decision shifts its
emphasis from being strictly the disallowance of only one
prayer, to become the disallowance of at least one prayer and
possibly other similar activities. This fact coupled with
the connotations implicit in the phrase "the constitutional
wall of separation," seems well to cause the decision as a
whole to lend itself to a far broader interpretation. There
seems, then, at least at this point in the discussion, to be
Bome ground for the criticism of Reinhold Hiebuhr, "This
decision practically suppressed religion, especially in the
public schools."^ Scmiething of a mitigation can be found in
the closing portion of the sentence, however, in the words;
"as a part of a religious program carried on by government."
There is not thesslightest hint here that there may be any
thing wrong with the government carrying on a religious
program, Just that the government in doing so, certainly
must not be writing the prayers for them. A disagreement is
^'As cited in, "After June 25, 1962," America, 10?:
483-84, July 14, 1962.
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evident at this point between the majority of the Justices
and Justice Douglas, who says, "The question presented by
this case Is therefore an extremely narrow one. It Is
whether or not Hew Yoric oversteps the bounds when It finances
a religious exercise." (D. 3) Even If there were essential
agreement on this point, however, there would still seem to
be some JvistlfIcatlon for the statement made by Christianity
Today t
[The declslo^ does not preclude anyone's private
prayers In the classroomj It does not even exclude
group prayers; what It does exclude Is government
approved prayers In public schools.^
It may logically be Interpreted, also, to exclude other gov
emmentally approved activities, but the essence of this
statement Is true, that all religious activities are not
automatically excluded�Just those of government origin, and
even these may possibly be sanctioned, though It Is at least
not the job of the government to be composing official
prayers for such activities. If, Indeed, these are pemlssable.
Thus, what Is definitely established Is that govem
mentally composed prayers are In violation of the Constitution.
The language of the decision Indicates aame possibility of
toleration for government sponsored religious programs, but
the phmsas "wall of separation" and "at least" seem to cast
9"Supreme Court Prwrer Ban; Where Will It X�ad?"
nh..ijti>nlty TQdft3C, 6s25-26, July 20, 1962.
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�hadova of doubt over this. On the other hand, something
that has definitely not been forbidden by the decision Is
free, and volxintary devotional periods In the classrooms when
all membere concerned are In agreement with the preotice.
David Ifiwrence in an editorial In U.S. News adds some other
pertinent and acceptlble practices:
Dfhe Supreme Court] heusn't barred the teaching of
morellty or the philosophy of hvman brotheriiood, or the
spread of knowledge concerning Christianity or Buddhism
or any of the other religions of the irorld. To permit
in the public schools the study of codes of human be
havior is not to create "an establishment of religion."!^
History of Ssligious Bstabliahments (B. 4-7)
"it is a matter of history," continues the document,
"that this very prectice of establishing govemmentally composed
preyers for religious services was one of the reasons which
caused many of our early colonists to leave England and seek
religious freedom in Amezdca." (B. 4)
Thotigh it is true that no criticisms of the factual
qualities of this section have been relsed, the pertinence of
it has been widely questioxwd. By no means the least in
importance of the questlonere, is Justice Stewart, who says:
What is relevant to the issue here is not the history of
an established church in sixteenth century England or in
eighteenth century America, but the history of the reli
gious treditions of our people, reflected in countless
�'^^l^vld Lawreioe, "Is Preyer in the Public Schools
Really Barred?! Mewa. 53siOO, July 9, 1962.
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practices of the Institutions and officials of our gov
ernment. (8. 2)
The reason for this criticism Is hased upon an entirely dif
ferent approach to the problem than that taken here�as will
be seen. It Is significant, to note, though, that this dis
cussion Is challenged.
What Justice Black has tried to establish, however. Is
the reasoning behind the First Amendment upon which the entire
question of CSiurch-State relatiohs rises and falls in the
tfalted States. This section, therefore, is to provide a
needed background for that article of the Constitution deemed
violated by the prayer.
The First Constitutional Amendment (B. 7-15)
In this soctlaa are to be found the most basic con
cepts of the entire docximent, for herein lie the reasons for
the decision reached. It must, therefore, be studied with
the utmost care. For this reason, the section will be studied
in the following three aspects t (X) Reasons for the Adoption
of Amendment I, (2) Interpretation of Amendment I, and (3)
Application of Amendment I to the preyer.
Reasons for the Adoption of Amendment I. By the time
the Constitution was adopted, many people knew that the union
of Church and State was a dangerous thing. (B. 7) "One of
the greatest dangere to the freedom of the
individual to wor
ship in his own way lay In the government's placing its
official
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staap of approval vipon one particular kind of prayer or one
particular form of religious services." (B. 8) Kie phrase
"the freedoa of the individual" seems to be of particular
relavance here, for it is pointed out that not only is gov-
emment hurt by an established religion, but of more Is^rtance
to the democratic mind, the individual is harmed. "The Pirst
Amendment was added to the Constitution to stcuid as a guar
antee that neither the power nor the prestige of the Pederal
Oovemment would be used to control, support or Influence the
kinds of pnyer the American people can say ..." (B. 8)
Of great significance here is the observation that the
establishment of religion constitutes a danger to the freedom
of the individual. It is a threat to the government and to
religion, also (B. 9), but its primary threat is to the free-
d^ of the Individual to worship as he pleases. Rev. Qrover
C. Bagby, a Methodist minister, writes concerning this idea:
Many are asserting that the desire of the founding
fathere to establish freedom of religion did not at all
mean they wished to establish freedom from religion. Ihe
fact of the matter is, there can never be the one without
the other. Religious faith by its very nature is volun
tary. Much as unbelief is to be deplored from a religious
point of view, freedom to believe cannot really exist
except as it is accon^anied by freedom to disbelieve.^
Thus, the freedom of the individual to worehlp as he pleases,
must also be seen as the freedom of an individual to not
l^Orover C. Bagby, "The Supzvme Court and Preyer,"
The Christian Advocate, 6:11'p1S, August 16, 1962.
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worship ftt all if ho so pleases. This freedom is most assuredly
endangered, Justioe Black declares, whenever the government
plaoes a stamp of approval upon any particular prayer or form
of worship. This is obvious in the case of an individual
whose religion is co^lete disbelief, and only sll^tly less
so for those whose religions are more subtly different from
the "nom." It is not illogical, then, that the argvoent of
the document oontinuesi
. . . Ttia Plrst Amendment was added to the (tonetltutlon
to stand as a gxiarantee that neither the power nor the
prestige of the Pederal Ctovemment would be used to
control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the
American people can say-- (B. 8}
The dlaoussion of this section concludes with a statement
quite similar to that found on page four of the official
transoi^pt. It Is presented for the sake of coi^^rlsoni
. Oovemment in this country, be It state or federal,
JLs without power to prescribe by law any particular form
of prayer which la to be used as an official prayer in
carrying on any program of govemmentally sponsored re
ligious activity. TB. 8}
It is to be noticed that the qualifying phrase "at least"
Is not here to confuse the issue. Hor is the concept of a
"wall of separation" to be found. The idea presented is
very much like those who would seek to interpret the decision
strictly in relation to the Regents' prayer would want it.
However, it is also to be noted that the qualifying phrases
of the statements on page four are in no way abrogated. They
must, therefore, be considered as part of the thinking of
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Justice Black, though not reiterated at this point. Thla
is inportant to the consideration of the interpretation of
the Pirst Amendment which he makes in the further discussion
of the problem.
What is said, is that the government has no right to
compose prayers for its people, and that is all that is said.
Justice Black continues by pointing out that imder the Pirst
Amendment as made applicable to the states by the Pourteenth
Amendment, "government in this country ... is without power
to prescribe by law any particular fozn of prayerwwhioh is
to be used as an official prayer in carrying on any program
of govemmentally sponsored religious activity." (B. 8} In
agreement with this, Edward 0. Miller writes in the Episcopal
publication The Qiurchman,
Basically the Pirst Amendment was adopted because the
Pounding Pathers believed that religion flourishes best
where it is the responsibility of the church and the
home� that religion thrives where it is voluntary and
not dependent on the coercive power of the state.
Thus, the careful study of irtiat the document actually says,
leaves less and less room for the supposition that all de
votional activities in classrooms are abolished by this
Supreme (H>urt decision. However, the stttdy is not yet com
plete .
l^Sdward 0. Miller, "The Suprwe Court and Religion,"
The (Siurchman, 176:6-7, September, 1962.
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Interpretation of Amendment I. Having adequately dla-
cuBsed the reasons for the adoption of the Plrst Amendment,
the dooument In point begins Its Interpretation with the dog
matic statement, "There can be no doubt that New York's state
prayer program officially establishes the religious beliefs
embodied in the Regent's prayer." (B. 8) The dogmatic
tone of this assertion Is unbecoming to the rest of the doc
ument, for the very question In point Is, "Does this prayer
program establish a religion, or not?" If there were Indeed
"no doubt" that It did establish a religion, or even the
religious sentiments conveyed within It, It wovild doubtless
have never been approved by the Board of Regents to begin
with and certainly It would not have come all the way up to
the Iftilted States Supreme Ck>urt! That there Is, In fact, a
great deal of doubt la amply attested not only by Justioe
Stewart, who says, "I cannot see how an 'official religion'
Is established by letting those i^o want to say a prayer say
It" (8. 1); but even by Justice Douglas In his Concurring
Opinion, "... I cannot say that to authorize this prayer Is
to establish a religion In the strictly historic meaning of
those woz^s. A religion is not established in the usual sense
merely by letting those who chocse to do so say the prayer that
the public school teacher leads." (D. 6) This stat<ment,
by Justice Black, begs the question and weakens the argument
of the Majority Opinion. Nor does he fully substantiate his
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point when he states that neither the denominational neutrality
of the prayer nor the freedom to dissent from reciting it, is
able to free the program from the limitations of the Establish
ment Clause. This clause, argument runs, can be violated by
any law which establishes an official religion, whether or not
the laws "operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals
or not." (B. 9) However valid this argument may be will be
discussed later, but from the sheer standpoint of what is
said, he still fails to fvilly substantiate that the Regents'
prayer does, Inffact, establish a religion. This he has
stated dogmatically and has left unsubstantiated. He next
points out that the first and most immediate puzpose of the
Bstablistment Clause "rested on the belief that a union of
goverxBBent and religion tends to destroy government and to
degrade religion." (B. 9)
Justice Black has indicated quite well that there are
religious qualities in the prayer; but this does not by it
self mean it is an official establishment. He has quite sat
isfactorily pointed out that the purpose of the first Amend
ment was at least to prevent goverranents from writing prayers .
At this point, it appears that his argument Is very strong,
however, one of the strong contentions of the respondents
needs to bo answered� the very point which won favorable
decisions in the Mew York Courts�that though the program
including the prayer was religious and govemmentally sponsored.
35
the constitutional rights of the petitioners were not violated
because they had been given full opportunity not to partici
pate, l^us, though the prayer Itself might be poor for having
been written by an agency of the government, the contention
Is that there Is not an establishment of religion as long as
the individuals within the dissenting group are free to dis
sent. The discussion on page nine of the Majority Opinion
seeks to refute this contention, by comparing the Free Exer
cise Clause and the Establishment Clause:
Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally
neutral, nor the fact that its observance on the part of
the students is voluntary can serve to free it from the
limitations of the Establishment Clause, as it might from
the Free Exercise Clause. (B. 9)
Two things appear heres (l) the prayer is not considered
neutral and (2) the fact that the students were allowed to
leave the room does not mitigate the fact that the New York
Board of Regents had no right to compose a prayer. Thus,
the prayer program is limited by the Establishment Clause,
whether the rights of the individuals guaranteed by the Free
Exercise Clause wei?e protected or not, thoiigh indeed they
were in this case�as is indicated when he says that these
two factors might serve to free the program from the Free
Exercise Clause. He is admitting here, then, that the only
consideration In this case is the Establishment Clause, for
the Free Exercise Clause is unvlolated by either the program
or the prayer itself. Thia is of basic importance to an
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underatandlng of this doovraent. At this point in the dis
cussion, it would seem that the every excellent letter written
by a Nr. John B. Degges of Wesson, Mississippi, to the editors
of the Presbyterian Journal, best explains what has been said :
It is xmconstitutlonal for a legislative body to en
force prayer in public places. But it is also unconsti
tutional for any body, legislative or Judicial, to pro
hibit all public prayer in any public place, be it a
public school or state parte or any other place where
people congregate as citizens. ^3
The argument is, therefore, that though the government has no
right to compose and enforce prayers, neither has any govern
mental agency the right to disallow all prayers from public
places, and this point is well illustrated in the later por
tion of the document. Thus, to this point, all that can be
definitely established, is that this prayer and others like
it�being composed by governmental agencies�are out of har
mony with the purpose of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The discussion of the Free Exercise Clause and
the Establishment Caluse is continued, but irtiat is aaid in
the next several sentences only aeT^m to obscure the import
of the document. It is vague and only after the most careful
study is it perfectly clear what is really being said.
The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause,
does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental
compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which
establish an official religion whether those laws
l3john B. Degges, "Religion in Public Life," The
Presbyterian Journal, 21:24, October 10, 1962.
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operate directly to coerce r�>nobservlng Individuals or
not. (B. 9)
Act\ially#,all this Is saying Is exactly what was said above,
that a government could establish an official religion with
out directly coercing dissenters Into agreement with It,
and still violate the First toendment Establishment Clause,
while observing the Free Exercise Clause. The truth of this
Is admitted above, but exception must be taken with Implica
tions Involved In the phrase, "unlike the Free Sxerelse
Clause" for though the two clauses are admittedly quite dif
ferent, they may be violated In exactly the saiue ways. That
Is to say, that the Free Exercise Clause does not depend
solely upon "direct governmental compxilslon" in order to be
violated, but can be violated by the subtle restraints placed
upon the religious elements of society by a government seek
ing to remain neutrel to the conflicting religious and Irrellr
gious elements within its care. As Mr. Degges states further
on in his letter to the editors of the Presbyterian Journal,
"If preyer be prohibited by law, then atheismi Is favored,
and atheism is a religion." Be states here, of course, "if
preyer be prohibited by law ..." but earlier he said, "it
is unconstitutional for any body, legislative or Judicial, to
prohibit all public prayer ..." and the reasoning is made
^^Ibid.
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clear that Judicial reatmint placed upon the praying meiahera
of society to keep them from praying la a violation of the
Free Sxercise Clause, and in a real sense, is an Batahllshraent
of Religion�the religion of atheism. The idea, therefore,
that the Free Exercise Clause can only be violated by "direct
goveiroaental compulsion" as Implied by the Majority Opinion,
does not seem Justified. The discussion continues with the
observation, that even should a govertment attempt to estab
lish a religion, and maintain a freed<�i for dissenters, it
should not be able to succeed.
When the i>ower, prestige and financial support of govern
ment is placed behind a particular religious belief, the
Indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to
conform to the prevailing officially approved religion
is plain. (B. 9)
Here again. Justice Black seems to state dogmatically an
assertion which is questionable, for it does not seem at all
plain that the individual is coerced b� the government, if
satisfactory safe-guards are made for the person's rights to
dissent. Whatever pressures one might feel, as was felt by
t^e children of the petitioners in this case, could not have
been actual, but psychological�not from without, but from
within themselves. If the dissenters chose not to accept
their constitutional prerogative of leaving the room, and
they felt internal, psychological pressures to confom when
they remained, it is not the faiat of the government which
offered them a valid alternative. It does not, therefore.
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aeem to be 30 plain that a raligioua minority is necessarily
coerced as long as the individual jtBembers of the minority ara
free to dissent. Be this as it may. Justice Black has attempted
here to thi^>w into question whether the children of th2
petitioners were really granted their full rights, even under
the Free Exercise Clause. He has, therefore, made the entire
practice of governmental ly supported religious exercises
questionable. However, all the discussion of the Free Exer
cise Clause is pretty much aside from the main issue, which
is based almost exclusively upon the Establishment Clause.
Therefore, from the standpoint of Implication, it must be
admitted that the conclusion of this section, stated onrpage
twelve of the transcript, is true, that "The New totk laws
Officially prescribing the Regents' prayer are inconsistent
with both the purposes of the Establishment Clause and with
the Establishment Clause itself." There is some question be
cause of the dogmatic assertions irtilch ere only partially
BUbstantlated--and theaonly by implication�by the text. The
discxission concenaing coercive pressures upon dissenting min
orities by activities of government sponsorship, though ex
traneous, nonetheless affectively casts a shadow of doubt upon
the practices. In any case, however, one thing which has not
come out with even the slightest doubt oast upon it, is the
complete freedom of any individual to worship voluntarily as
he pleases. It would, therefore, seem absolutely pennlsslble
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for devotional exeroieeB to be conducted within the echools,
by teaoheFB, if none of the students in their charge had any
objections. There is, for this reason, no Justification for
such statements as the following:
Now it would be the height of absurdity to think Justice
Black is aocxiaing New York State of founding a new reli
gion or a new denomination, and that he is fearful that
s<HBe Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, or others will
be coerced into leaving the church of their heritage and
Joining the Mew State Oiurch! NO, the barb of his ration
alisation is aimed only indirectly at the Regents' prayer
in particular] it is thrust at religion in gene]na.^->
On page twelve of the official transcript of the de
cision, the interpretation is finally linked to the prayer
itself J "The New Yoric laws officially prescribing the Regents'
preyer are inconsistent with both the purposes of the Bstab-
lishment Clause and with the Establishment Clause itself."
It would seem that the first part of this statement is quite
adequately demonstrated in the description of the purposes
behind the Clause j i.e., it is at least the purpose to keep
goverment out of the prayer-writing business. This should
be siiffioient to put the validity of the prayer in question,
but the second half of the statement�that the prayer is
Inconsistent with the Establishment Clause itself�seems
unsubstantiated by the discussion, �lerefore, though the
document adequately interprets both the purpose of the First
15a. Lewis Payne, "One Nation Under Ood," The Free
Methodist, 95�4-5, July 24, 1962.
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Amendment, and the Amendment Itself, it has not as yet demon
strated that these interpretations correlate sufficiently
with the interpretations of the prayer program to establish
a violation of the former by the latter.
Application of Amendment I to the Prayer. The con
cluding portion of the Majority Opinion is a valuable contri
bution to the overall thrust of the docximent. He begins:
It has been argued that to apply the Constitution in
such a way as to prohibit state laws respecting an estab
lishment of religious services in public schools is to
indicate a hostility toward prayer. Nothing, of course,
could be more wrong. The histoiry of man is inseparable
frcMn the history of religion. And perhaps it is not too
much to say that since the beginning of that history
many people have devoutly believed that "More things are
wrought by prayer than this world dreams of. (B. 12)
With this the Amen^ent is applied to all state laws which
establish religious services in publlo schools. It cannot
be too st3E�ngly emphasized, however, that no mention is made
of voluntary worship�only of govemmentally prescribed seS"
vices. As a matter of fact, there seems to be a definite
encouragement of voluntaiy services, in the recognition that
"the history of man is inseparable from the history of reli
gion." This ia a most significant statement for it officially
recognizes the Importance of religion to man. This recogni
tion seems to mitigate the "wall of separation" of which he
spoke earlier. He continues his discussion by pointing back
to the men who first came to America, and to those who wrote
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights as men "of this same
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faith in the power of prayer." "These men knew," he says,
"that the first Amendment, irtiich tried to put an end to govern
mental contzK>l of religion and of prayer, was not written to
destroy either.
"
Religion and prayer are basic to the. lives
of men today as they were of the men who wrote the Constitu
tion and the Bill of Rights, Justice Black is saying. (B.
13-14) His argument has been that when government writes
men's prayers, and prescribes their religious services, it
seeks to usurp a basic freed(�n from the Individual. Thna, the
statement is made that the government must not write prayers,
but leave that practice to the religious leaden. (B. 14)
In this connection, Milton friedman, in an editorial in the
Jewish daily newspaper. The American Examiner, praises the
Court with a note of sarcasm:
Justice Black and five other Justices ruled in the
�rue interest of religious freedom. Oovemment� federal,
state, or municipal�must leave the writing of prayers
to clergy. Legislators have enough responsibility in
writing laws.^o
The concluding quotation of James Madison on page fifteen
of the transcript is also extremely pertinent, showing the
broad way in which the phrase "religious establishment" was
used by Mr. Madison, irtio, as Justice Black points out, is the
author of the firat Amendment. In confirmation of the broad
meaning given the tera by Madison, the reader is directed to
l^Milton friedman, "Oains Seen for Nation in Court's
Ruling," JWie American Examiner, p. 16.
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th� apticl* by Irving Brandt in the July 30, issue of the
New Republic magasine entitled "Madison and the Prayer Case,"
a most scholarly article which studies the 'Memorial and
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
'
by Madison and
make some very pointed observations, such as the following:
Cnie thrust of the work] was against tax support of
religious teachere as "an establishment of religion.'
Variants of that phrese were used over ani over� 'establish
(Siristianity , "the establishment proposed by the bill,
'
"the establishment in question,
' "the proposed estab
lishment," "the legal establishment," any one estab
lishment," (opening the way to) "any other establishment
in all cases whatsoever." With this broad meaning of
"an establishment of religion' made overwhelmingly in
this memorial, which was the precursor of the First
Amendment, could anything be more illogical than to
contend that the very same words when inserted into the
federel Consititution refer only to the forsial estab
lishment of an official state churehfl'
The broad interpretation of the Firet Amen^ent made in the
Majority (pinion�to the effect that included in the phrese
"establishment of religion" is the idea of religious prac
tices, and not only organized religious associations and de
nominations�must be accepted as consistent with the purpose
of the First Amendment. Ttie decision, therefore, which de
clares the Regents' preyer in violation of the First Amendment,
is valid. In addition to this, any other goveriBaentally
supported religious exercises in public schools are deemed
unconstitutional by the same token. In question, by ii^li-
l^irving Brendt, "Madison and the Prater Case," New
Republic, 147:18-20, July 30, 1962.
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cation, though not by direct ata tenant, are any and all govern �
mentally supported religious practices; while definitely
permissible are all voluntary expressions of religious
faith whether In public or private.
Conclusion (B. 15 )
Briefly and simply the conclusion of the document is,
in reality, the actual judgment itself)
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York is
reversed and the cause r^aanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion. (B. 15 }
The conclusion adds very little to the inqplications
of what has gozM on before, except that it states that what
ever action is taken in the future, must not be inconsistent
with this opinion. This is a definite restriction which,
were it ever deemed necessary, could only be overcame in one
way�Constitutional Amendment. This possibility will be
discussed fully in the last chapter of this thesis.
U. BVALOATION
The discussion heretofore has been concerned only
with the text of the decision�what it says, what it means�
but it is also very important to discuss the decision in the
light of its overall value. Is the decision and the accompanying
opinions "one of the finest documents In the history of the
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or chiipch-state relations in the United Statea"?^^ Or la
it, on the other hand, "a disintegretlon of a sacred American
heritage"?19 One author notes that it is unrealistic to
assume that there were not far-reaching Implications in the
decision, for one of the basic considerations is the plural
istic society in which we live, and in what sense this society
is to be interpreted. He charges that the Oourt has overruled
the rights of the majority in trying to recognize the rights
of the minority because they did not know how to serve the
wills of both.^� Hor is this author alone in this view. John
B. Sheerin expresses a similar view in the Pathol Ic World
magazine,
" [The decisio^ izijured the prestige of the Court
by nourishing the suspicion of blandishments offered to a
tiny minority at the expense of the Jiuit rights of the majority
of citizens. Raymond P. Jennings siiggests in Btemity
magazine!
To be sure we must not minimize the presence in our
society of those of atheistic or at least agnostic tend
encies who would undeziaine our religious heritage. Our
B. Garret, "High Court Rules Out State Prayer in
School," The Wesleyan Methodist, 120*12, August 15, 1962.
"'^Herbert Hoover, as cited in, Tti& Mew York Times,
June 27, P. 20.
2�"The Court on Prayer," Commonweal, 76 �387-88, July
13, 1962.
^^John B. Sheerin, "The Ban on Public School Prayer,"
Catholic World, 1955 261-63, August, I962.
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American way of life does not require that, because there
Is a minority who dissents, we must curtail certain
activities or observances thus allowing them to control
and dominate our society. If adequate provision is made
for a dissenting minority In any situation to absent or
excuse Itself from the observances of the majority, then
our Constitution Is honored.
Here, of course. Is a direct disagreement with the findings
of the Court as explained In the Majority Opinion, for Justice
Black and the other Justices feel that It Is not sufficient
for the minority to be able to absent Itself from such obser
vances. The question of minorities and majorities found one
of Its most critical proponents In Amos N. Wilder In the
magazine Christianity and Crisis �
When In such issues do we have a genuine question of
minority rights and when a mere matter of minority defen-
siveness? After all, minority opinion and minority
groups should not ask society to concede on every thing
that comes up . . .
The disturbing thing about the Supreme Court decision
is the Implication that minority dissent can ban any
foiTOs of public religious reference. Any further moves
in that direction should be challenged. Minorities can
ask too much. The tail should not wag the dog.''-^
Thoxigh Mr. Wilder seems to go a bit far with the statement
that the "tall should not wag the dog," he has certainly put
his finger on an issue of primary Importance in this and
22Raymond P. Jennings, "Is the Supreme Court Right?"
Eternity, 13:12-15/, September, I962.
23Amos N. Wilder, "Minorities and Professional Min
orities," Christianity and Crisis, 22:136, Avigust 6, 1962
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similar caaea, "When . . . do we have a genuine question of
minority rights and when a mere matter of minority defensive-
ness?" Tb&t the petitioners in this case were not actually
losing any of their rights is substantiated by the fact that
the Judgment was made upon the basis of the Establishment
Clause and only the most vague, extraneous reference being
made to the possibility that they may have had some element
of coercion. This is supported by Justice Stewart, as well,
in his Dissenting Opinion: "The Court does not hold," he
writes, "nor could it, that New Yoric has interfered with the
free exercise of anybody's religion." (S. 1) The decision
has taken on its objectionable aspects, then, in that many
look at it as a victory for a defensive minority whose feel
ings were hurt, but whose rights were in no way threatened.
As in the case with ai^ controversy, however, there are two
sides to this question. The opposite viewpoint was well stated
in a New York Times editorial shortly after the decision was
reached :
There are persons who want to pray in their own way,
or not at all. Doubtless those who oppose school prayers
are a minority. But the Constitution was designed pre
cisely to protect minorities; and the First Amendment
bars the majority at any time from ordaining an estab
lishment of religion." ... if there is one thing that
the establishment clause must mean; it is that government
may not set up a religious norm from which one has to be
excused�as was the case with the children in the New Yoric'
school who did not wish to recite the prayer. 24
24Bditorial in f)ie Hew York Times, June 27* 1962, p. 34.
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�-'ne of the very fine interpretations of this problem Is that
by John C. Bennett In Christianity and Crisis:
The relation between the positive form of religious
liberty and negative religious liberty from minorities
who object to having any relation to a religious practice
is a very deligate one and oalls for much give and take
on both sides. '^-^
The problem is indeed a most delicate one which will not only
demand a great deal of give and take on both sides, but there
should also be a great deal of earnest discuusion between the
two sides before such issues as that Involved here arise.
In any case, however, the idea that the decision serves only
the minority viewpoint is not held by all. In an editorial
in (airlst ianity Today, the following observation is made :
Perhaps significantly tthe Court's explanation of its
decision did not defend the rights of the irreligious.
Black's majority opinion implicitly took the position that
the decision serves the religious cause. 2d
A similar emotion is expressed in The Churchman:
Nineteen leaders from nine Protestant denq^ninations
endorsed the niling of the Supreme Court . . .
We call upon the American people to study this de
cision prayerfully and without political emotion. We
believe the court's ruling against officially written
and officially prescribed prayers protects the integ
rity of the religious conscience and the preper function
of religious and governmental institution. '
25john C. Bennett, "Absolutism in the Supreme Court,*
Christianity and Crisis, 22 : 135* August 6, 1962 .
2^David D. Pield, "Church State Separation: A Serpen
tine Wall?" Christianity Today, 6:29-31* July 20, 1962.
2T"Rullng, " The Churchman, 176:16, September, 1962.
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The Chrlatlan Advocate expresses Itself thus :
Who really loses In the Supreme Court decision? Cer
tainly not the children of Christians, who sould be
thoro\;!ghly familiar with prayers in their homes, in their
ohurchob on Sunday�and, hopefully, during the weekday
training. Nor will the non-Christian religious children
have never likedsschool prayers anyway.
The only losers are those persons who prefer their
religion on a bland diet, deceiving themselves or being
deceived into thinking that "In Ood We Trust" will
somehow make us a Christian nation.
Far from being tragic, the Supreme Court decision
may well be a step forward wherein Ood can finally climb
off the coins and into the hearts of the American people. 2�
Very few, however, are quite so "wide-eyed" in their optimism
as is this editorial writer- The last word has not been said
on either side. Many are still putting their comments in
print concerning what they think the real value of the decialon
might be. Almost all, however, are in agreement on one thing,
at least; and that is that Important as this decision may be,
it is only a starter. Similar cases are presently on the
docket of the Supreme Court at the time of writing of this work,
and more are expected to come before it--much will depend
upon how these cases are decided. For this reason, the dis
cussion of the value of this decision cannot be brought to a
final conclusion until all the data from these other caaes are
in. Let this observation by the editors of Ghriatianity
Today end the diacussionj
28"|#hat Ood in the Schools?" Christian Advocate,
4:2, July 19, 1962.
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A comprehenalve Insight into the Supreme Court's
views on church- state separation cannot, however, be
drawn merely from this narrow strip of decision. The
nation's highest Judiciary must yet rule on Important
cases originating in Maryland and Pennsylvania C^nd now
PloridaJ. Most imperative will be an enunciation by the
Supreme Court of guiding principles that will prevent
both ant1- religious government and sectarian government.
If the Supreme Court is unable to draw a consistent
line between the wholly godless state and a state religion,
then the nation needs a new team of umpires. ^9
29"supreme Oourt Prayer Ban: Where Will It Lead?"
Christianity Today, 6:25-26, July 20, 1962.
CHAPTER III
ANALYSIS OF THE CONCURRINQ OPINION
Wh�n a Supreme Court Justice Is In agreement with the
majority, but comes to his conclusions by another line of
reasoning than they, he may write a concurring opinion In
which he sets forth his own views. When this Is done, the
concurring document Is Important In that It represents the
official opinion of a legal expert�of a Supreme Court Justice
--which Is a valiiable opinion whether In complete agreement
with the majority In that particular case, or not. The same,
of course. Is true even of dissenting oplnlonsj for both
kinds of documents may be, and frequently are, referred to In
subsequent cases of similar nature. It Is, therefore, per
tinent to turn now to an analysis of the Concurring Opinion
of Justioe Douglas.
I. STUDY
As a literary document, this opinion has less to offer
than the text of the Majority Opinion. The logic In this
opinion Is not as completely nor as Intricately presented,
though the Ideas are fairly well expressed. The language,
like that of Justice Black Is slnqple and non- technical, even
where other cases are cited. The document, being of Its con
troversial nature, elicited a great many comments�mostly
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negative�but surprisingly few sttesqpts at actual refutation,
and even fewer�if any�attempts at substantiation. For the
purposes of this study, the text of Justioe Douglas' opinion
will be outlined pez4iaps more from the standpoint of convenience
than logio�as follows:
IMTRODUCTIOH 1_2
I. Background of the Case 2-3
II. Ttie (pinion Itself 3-7
A. The basic question 3
B. Bases for opinion 3-0
C. Exceptions with Majority Opinion 6-7
HI. Legal Bases for the Opinion 7-9
A. Interpretation of Amendment 1 7
B. Consideration of complications 7-9
CONCLOSIOM, . 9
This outline will be used as the basis for study in the re
mainder of this chapter.
Introduction (D. 1-2)
The discussion begins with only the vezy briefest
introduction in which the basic idea of the entire opinion
is stated bluntly arui with little concern for the force with
which it will be received, "it is customary," the document
begins, "in deciding a constitutional question to treat it in
its narrowest fom." This is a happy situation and, irtien con
sidered briefly, is readily seen to be the way things should be.
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However, Justioe Douglas makes an abrupt about-face and says,
"Yet at tJjses the setting of the question gives It a fom
and content which no abstract treatment ootild do." With this
said, he seems promptly to raverse the customary procedure
of Interpreting Constitutional questions In their narrowest
form- -which, presumably, might be the form advocated In the
Majority Opinion�and proceeds to broaden the question under
consideration, from the constitutionality of one goveramentally
composed prayer, to "whether the Oovemment can constitutionally
finance a religious exercise." Such a radical shift In
breadth seems quite unwarranted by the situation In^polnt, and
certainly It Is at least an unwarranted statement to make with
out some kind of prior substantiation. All the same, the
discussion continues with the observation that our system on
both federal and state levels is "honeycombed with such fin
ancing." "Mevertheless," he remarks, "I think it is an wcon-
stltutlonal undertaking whatever fora it takes." (D. 2)
It Is this point of view which brought upon the opinion the
great number of irete ctnmnents which it received. One such
comment, in a mild form, is the following:
Some basis for real alam appears in the concurring
opinion of Justice William 0. Douglas, who inclined to
the view that all public ceremonial and patriotic re
ferences to Ood are unconstitutional�even the prayer
with t^lch the Supreme Court opens its sessions!
l^Ood Save . . . This Honoreble Court," The Wesleyan
Methodist, 120:5, August 1, 1962.
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His language is hard� too hard, perhaps�especially when his
argument has not as yet been presented. Ihe question, of
course, is whether or not his argument ever fully substanti
ates his contention or not, but it certainly cannot be said
to have done so to this point. The stat�nents in the text
of his opinion, however, are not the only point of contention
with the introduction to the document, for there is a foot
note to the statement on page one of the transcript concerning
the fact that oitr federal and state systems are honeycombed
with religious financing. ISils footnote is here reproduced
in fulli
There are many 'aids* to religion in this coontry at
all levels of government. To mention but a few at the
federal level, one might begin by observing that the very
First Congress which wrote the First Amendment provided
for chaplains in both Houses and in the amed services.
There Is compulsory chapel at the service academies, and
religlovis services are held in federal hospitals and
prisons. The President Issues religious proclamations.
The Bible is used for the administration of oaths.
H. T. A. and V. P. A. funds were available to parochial
schools during the deprasslon. Veterans receiving money
under the '0. I.' Bill of 1944 could attend denominational
schools, to which payments were made directly by the
government. During World War II, federel money was con
tributed to denominational schools for the training of
nurses. IRie benefits of the Ibtional School Lunch Act
are available to students in private aswwell as public
schools. The Hospital Survey and Construction Act of
1946 specifically made money available to non-public
hospitals. The slogan 'In Ood We Trust' is used by the
Treasury Department, and Congress recently added Cod to
the pledge of allegiance. There is Bible reading in the
schools of the District of Columbia, and religious in
struction is given in the District's National Training
School for Boys. Religious organizations are exempt from
the federal income tax and are granted postal privileges.
to defined limits�15 per cent of the adjusted gross
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Income of Individuals and 5 P�r oent of the net income
of corporations�contributions to religious organizations
are deductible for federal income tax purposes. There
are limits to the deductibility of gifts and bequests to
religious institutions made under the federal gift and
estate tax laws. This list of federal 'aids' could easily
be expanded, and of course there is a long list in each
state. Pellman, The Limits of Freedom (1959), PP. 40-41.
(D. 1-2)
This list of impressive�and cherished�federal institutions
and usages are all Jeopardized by this opinion which states
that all such aids are unconstitutional in his estimation.
Some of the items mentioned could be Justified on a secular
basis, while others are quite difficult to explain under
any interpretation of the First Amendment, but their exis
tence is not to be denied. The most pertinent observation,
however, is at the very beginning of the note, to the effect
that the First Coi^ress which wrote the First Amendment pro
vided for chaplains In both Houses and in the armed services.
It would seem, upon the basis of this observation,
that no
thing could be more obvious than that the
First Congress saw
nothing inconsistent with the First Amendment
in providing for
chaplains. Much talk la made about the original
intent of
James Madison, who penned the First Amendment, and
no doubt,
his original intent is a matter of legitimate concern.
The
greater concern to a democratic mind,
however, should not be
the intent of the author of the First Amen<toent,
for he was
confined to Just one Individual opinion. Of primary
Importance
is the intent of the entire body of the First Congress
which
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ratified his words and made them constitutionally binding
upon posterity. The astute discussions of Justice Black
(B. 4-7 especially), and of Justice Rutledge (D. 8) give
ample testimony to the bearing of the history of establish
ments upon the thinking of the penman of the Pirst Amendment,
and undoubtedly upon the Pirst Congress in general. Doubtless,
all these men were aware of the dangers of establishment�
else they would not have ratified that clause of the Pirst
Amendment. Tet, this same group of men saw fit to vote into
being the congressional and military chaplaincies. Justice
Douglas questions "whether the Oovemment can constitutionally
finance a religious exercise" and then proceeds to undennine
his own point of view by giving the contrariwise testimoi^ of
the men who first approved the Amendment and made it a part
of the Constitution. Their testimony is, "Yes, the govern
ment can finance religiotis exercises�have not we ourselves
established the congressional and military chaplaincies?" It
would certainly seem that Justice Douglas could not have
found more damaging testimony to his own argtment than this,
and here he has Included it as a part of his argument? It
would appear, therefore, that by the implications within
one
footnote. Justice Douglas has undermined his own position.
His argumentation, however, is not cooplete.
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Baokground of the Case (p. a-3)
The discussion here Is mostly baokgroTind with a minimum
of material vital to this study. There Is one portion, however,
whloh hears some notice >
Plainly, our Bill of Rights would not permit a State
or the Federel Oovemment to adopt an official preyer
and penalize anyone who would not utter It. This, how
ever. Is not that case, for there Is no element of
compulsion or coercion In Mew York's regulation requir
ing that public school be opened each day with the . � .
prayer -
In short, the only one who need utter the prayer Is
the teacherJ and no teacher Is complaining of It.
Students can stand mute or even leave the classroom. If
they desire. (D. 2-3)
There Is In this observation, a rather minor disagreement
with the Majority Opinion, which, though aware that there was
not any external coercion, felt that the prestige of the
t
State Oovemment of New York was powerful coercion In Itself
upon nonconforming elements. Justice Douglas seems to
question whether there was coercion or not on page six of his
opinion, so the decisive, positive language used here Is ne
gated by his later Inconsistency. It Is Isqposslble to decide
which Is his final view, though It Is to be suspected that
this, being earlier. Is not. In opposition to this procedure,
however, he points out In a footnote that students at all
three military academies are required (with the exception of
Firet Classmen at the Air Force Academy) to attend chapel
every Sunday. The coercive forces here are obviously from
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without, but that there were actual coercive forces In Mew
Toi* Is denied. Pressure from within the Individual may be
felt, but It Is questionable whether the government Is respon
sible for these pressures. It Is well, therefore, to observe
with Justice Stewart that "The Court does not hold, nor
could It, that Mew Yoric has Interfered with the free exercise
of anybody's religion." (S. l) Nor does Justice Douglas so
contend.
The Opinion Itself (D. 3-7)
The opinion of Justice Doiiglas Is given Its fullest
expression In this section and the next�the arguments are
given here and the legal substantiation In the next. This
section Is divided Into three subsections: (l) The Basic
Question, In which Justice Douglas conqpares this case with
the HoCollum Case and shows why this one Is different;
(2) The Bases for His (pinion. In which he points out several
governmental agenclesimhloh begin their fxmotlons with prayer,
making a comparison with the New Yoric schooljroom procedure; and
(3) The Bxceptlons with the Majority Opinion, In which sec
tion he points out his difference of opinion with the majority
of the Justices.
The Basic Question. The discussion of the basic
question under consideration begins with the following state
ment: "McCollum V. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 2O3, does not
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decide this case." (D. 3* Italics In original) This, follow
ing Imedlately upon the discussion of the history of the
case, with Its emphasis upon the privilege of the students
to participate or not to participate, appears at first to be
out of place�as though there were a sudden shift of thought
with no Intervening transition. Actually, however, that
this Is not true at all can be seen In the discussion of the
HcColliBB Case which follows:
HThe McCollum Case] Involved the use of public school
facilities for religious education of students. Students
either had to attend religious instruction or "go to
some other place in the school building for pursuit of
their secular studies. . . . Reports of their presence
or absence weretto be made to their secular teachers."
Id., at 209 . The influence of the teaching staff was
"EKerefore brought to bear on the student body, to sup
port the instilling religious principles. (D. 3)
There is a good deal more to the McCollum Case than is here
described, of course; and like all cases at law, there are
two sides to it as well. The synopsis given here is too
brief for any real Insights into the nature of the arguments
of either the petltlonere or the respondents of that case,
for this is doubtless the gist of the Majority Opinion of that
case�^rtiich could be quite different from the complaints of
the petltlonere. On the basis of what is presented here,
though, it is not difficult to discsm that the practices in
volved were essentially different from those of the gn&el Case.
It can be agreed that if a student is to leave his friends
and go to another room to study, where checks for attendance
60
will be made and returned to the teacher, a larger degree of
coercion would be felt than was the case in the New York
schools. Justice Douglas continues the discussion fi>om that
standpoint:
In the present case, school facilities are used to say
the preyer and the teaching staff is employed to lead the
pupils in it. There is, however, no effort at indoctri
nation and no attenqpt at exposition. Preyers of course
may be so long and of such a charecter as to amoimt to
an attempt at the religious instruction that was denied
the public schools by the McCollimt case. But New York's
preyer is of a charecter that does not involve any
element of proselytizing as in the McCollum case. (D. 3)
Thus, though school facilities are used, which factor wasoone
of the primary complaints in the McCollum case, there is a
difference. In that case there was a definite attempt to
teach religious principles� indoctrination, as Justioe Douglas
terms it�but in the New York preyer case, this is not the
situation at all. The Regents' preyer is of a religious
nature as the Majority Opinion declares (B. 3-4), but that
the primaz*y purpose in its usage was not the teaching of the
principles in^licitly contained in it, is the contention of
this Concurring Opinion. Similarly, there is no "attempt at
exposition" as In that case. By this. Justice Douglas refers
to the taking of attendance and the reporting back to the
secular teacher in the McCollum case and the fact that one was
permitted to remain silently in place in the New York situation.
This is a basic difference. The fact that Justice Douglas
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sees no real attempt at indoctrination ia Bignificant for his
disagreement with the Majority Opinion more than for any bear
ing it might have in his own argument. Justice Douglas, states:
"New York's prayer is of a character that does not involve
any element of proselytizing as in the McCollum case." (D. 3)
The basis for deciding the case, then, cannot be for him the
principles within the prayer. If the prayer is unconstitutional,
it is on another basis. To him the question in this case
appears as a very narrow one. "it is," as he says, "whether
New Yoi* oversti^B the bounds when It finances a religious
exercise." There is a possible element of agreement with
the Majority Opinion in this, for it must be recalled that
the Majority Opinion does not definitely establish whether
the goverranent may or may not Join in any religious exercise
at all, but leaves this question hanging in the balance. 2
Thus, though the interpretation which Justice Doiiglas puts
on the Firet Amendment is extremely bread, the interpretation
of the question at hand is quite narrow, but to him nonethe
less involved in the broad interpretation of the Amendment.
His position, therefore, is to establish two things: (l) that
this case is Included in and affected by his interpretation
of the Firet Amendment, and (a) that his interpretation of
the First Amendment is true and valid. He has, therefore^ the
See pages twenty- two to twenty-eight above.
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necesalty of establishing two arguments, whereas opponents to
his position have only to disprove one of the two to disprove
his entire thesis. He begins his discussion by attempting
to establish the first of these two basic ppoints of his
position.
The Bases for the Opinion. "What New Toric does on
the opening of its public schools la what we do when we open
court," he begins. (D. 3) A significant beginning to his ar
gument, which he substantiates quite well in the next couple
of sentences:
Our Marshal has from the beginning aimounced the convening
of the Court and then added "Ood save the tJhited States
and this honorable court." That utterance is a suppli
cation, a prayer in which we, the Judges, are free to
Join, but which we need not recite any more than the
stvidenta need recite the New York prayer. (0. 3-4)
Again, there is a slight, though significant, reference to the
lack of coercion in the Mew Yoric schools. There is little
doubt that that phrase uttered by the Marshal at the opening
of each session of Court, is, indeed, a prayer. Nor is there
any denial of the fact that the Marshal is an employee of the
government. Thus, the point can be considered established
that the opening of each school day in New York, with prayer
by each teacher, is similar to the way in which the Supreme
Court opens its sessions. The discussion continues with the
statement: "What New Yoric does on the opening of its public
schools is what each House of Congress does at the opening of
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each day's business." (D. 4) To this statement are added
two footnotes, one showing that the same procedure is followed
in the New York Legislature and the other indicating that the
rules of both Houses provide that every calendar day's session
will be opened with prayer. Included with the latter obser
vation is that the salaries of the chaplains of the Senate
and the House are |8,8lO each per year. The supposition here,
that the procedure is the same, is somewhat less obvious
than in the case of the oper6ag of the Supreme Court, for
there are no fxai time chaplains of the schools of New York.
To the extent that the observation is made, however� that
both the teachers and the chaplains are public employees, at
that moment performing religioiis exercises� there is a simi
larity and the point may be considered to be established.
There enters here, however, the interesting footnote on the
statement which concludes that paregrephi "Oiaest chaplains
of various denominations also officiate." Most of this ex
tensive footnote is of interest only in content. The first
paregreph is the really important part, however � It sayst
It would, I assume, make no difference in the present
case if a different preyer were said every day or if the
ministers of the community rotated, each giving his own
preyer. For some of the petitioners in the present case
profess no religion. (0. 4}
This is an extremely questionable assertion for it would most
assuredly make a great deal of difference to the entire case.
First of all, it would make a difference to the Majority v
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Opinion of the Svqpreme Covirt, because the basis for Its decl-
nion was the the prayer, as an official governmental coiqyosl-
tlon, established the principles contained within It. Each
minister, expressing his own prayer, would automatically
preclude any objection from this ansle, for the very sl^le
reason that their prayers would not be composed by the gov
ernment, and therefore could not be "establishing religious
principles." Secondly, this kind of a situation would make
a vast difference to the arguments presentedhhe re by Justice
Douglas himself, for a minister of the community would doubt
less not accept ai^ honoraria�^muoh less a salary for doing
what he is supposed to do� leading people in spiritual exer
cises�and thus there would be no governmental siq>port of
religious exercise. Finally, there wo\ild be a tremendous dif
ference to the petitioners�no matter what their religious
beliefs (or disbeliefs )�for the reason that the basis for
litigation�The Establishment Clause of the First Amen<taent�
would not at all have been in effect. There might have been
some attempt to bring litigation on the basis of the Free
Exercise Clause, but as it was, the courts all (including the
Supreme Court) affirmed that there was no essential violation
of this Clause. Thus, the entire discussion seems pointless
and the footnote completely questionable. Its inclusion�
especially at this point�defies explanation. The basic
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argument la continued on pages five and six, with the next
real contribution to the opinion on the latter of the two.
Here he sums up his argument thus>
Tet for me the principle is the same, no matter how
briefly the prayer is said, for in each of the instances
given the person praying is a public official on the
public payroll, perforaing a religious exercise in a gov-
sinnmental institution. (B. 6)
The truth of the similarity is granted above, and it must be
admitted that both logically and Implicitly, he has estab
lished that if one of these practices is unconstitutional on
this basis, they are all unconstitutional on this basis. He
has, then, to establish that this interpretation of the first
Amendment is the right one in all cases and all of the prac
tices will, of necessity, be admitted unconstitutional. IHiere
are, however, some other considerations which he makes before
he goes into the last main point of his discussion. One of
these is the discussion of coercion noted earlier. It is a
confusing issue and not absolutely clear where he takes his
stand. In any case it is not of any real significance to the
arguments^ because his position is against the financial
aspects of the problem and not really with any ooerolve pos
sibilities. It is, at best, only a nod of recognition to the
extraneous observations of Justice Black (B. 9) and has very
little implication to the course of the decision. His dis
cussion continues with some of the points in which he differs
with the Majority Opinion.
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Bxceptlona with the Majority Opinion. Thovigh quite
Inconsistently deferring to the view that there might be �one
measure of coercion Involved In the saying of the Regents'
prayer (D. 6), Justice Douglas goes on to conclude that In
spite of that, he does not agree with the m Jorlty of the
Justices In their reasons for declaring the prayer to be un
constitutional. These things he says In this way:
At the same time I caimot say that to authorize this
prayer Is to establish a religion In the strictly his
toric meaning of those words. A religion Is not estab
lished In the usual sense merely by letting those who
choose to do so say the preyer that the public school
teacher leads. (D. 6)
His difference with the Ciourt Is basic. The primary
reason for the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the
prayer Is Its violation of the Establishment Clause, on this
basis. Justice Douglas, however, though agreeing that It Is
the Establishment Clause that Is violated, states that It Is
on an entirely different basis� that the goverxmient may not
finance religious exercises. He Is saying, in effect, that
the preyer would be constitutional except that it Is connected
with a program which is financed by a state government, dls,
to him. Is against the Constitution. If he Is wreng In this,
then he would be forced on the basis of this argvmient to say
that the preyer Is not unconstitutional. Before leaving this
section, however, there Is a pertinent idea expressed In one
of the footnotes on this page trtilch needs to be discussed.
In relation to the stat�aent that authorization of the prayer
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would not establish a religion In the historic sense of those
words, he appends a discussion In which he first mentions
the Court's critique of the history of establishments. Having
so done, he continues!
The Vlrst Amendment put an end to placing any one
church In a preferred position. It ended support of any
church or all churches by taxation. It went further
and prevented secular sanction to any religious ceremony,
dogjaa, or rite. Thus, It prevents civil penalities from
being applied against recalcitrants, or nonconformists.
(D. 6)
The first, second and last sentences of this note go unchal
lenged, for they ara accepted as valid almost unlveraally.
The one sentence, though, that It "prevented any secular
sanction to any religious ceramony, dogma, or rite," seems
a bit extrame, tmless taken In the completely legal sense
of the terra "sanction," which Is a provision by law of pen
alties or rewards In raspect to these things. Taken In this
sense, thera Is no question, but In the mora colloquial
usage of the word, which Is meraly to grant permission, ap
proval or even support�within bounds�this Interpretation Is
rather strong. It Is highly probable that the more restricted,
legal definition was Intended, and the note should be Inter
preted In that light. Therefore, as the discussion of this
section Is concluded. It must be granted that Justice Douglas
has succeeded In substantiating the firet necessary point t
that the prayer In question Is sufficiently similar to certain
other practices that If they are unconstitutional, so Is It.
He must now, however, prove that they are.
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Legal Bases for the Opinion (D. 7-9)
The legal opinions of past oases of a similar nature
are the means by whloh Justice Douglas seeks to justify his
position, and here again the limitations which bear upon this
study come into play. Tiie legal bases for the opinion of
Justice Douglas are good, but inconclusive la relation to
what he Is trying to establish through them, rram the point
of what la said illicitly in thla section, the argument can
not be said to be substantiated. Even though it would be
highly deslreble to study the cited cases, there Is little
basis to Indicate that the discussion would come out any
differently than Is here biought forth. Therefore, the
discussion and the conclusions of this section in this thesis
may be considered, to some extent, final. The section will
be studied from two points of views (l) Interpretations of
Amendment I, In i^lch section he deals with previous cases
and attempts to interpret the Piret Amendment through them,
and (2) Consideration of 0<�Rpllcatlons, in which he discusses
a decision which oompllcates his present views
Interpretation of Ameridment I. This section begins
wlthi^a most excellent observation:
"We are a religious people whose Institutions pre
supposes a Supreme Eeirig. Zorach v. Glauson, 343 U S-
306, 313. Odder our Bill of itlghts-free play is given
for making religion an active force In our lives. But
"if a religious leaven is to be worked Into the affairs
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of our people. It la to be done by individuals and
groups, not by the Oovemment." McOowan v. Maryland,
366 U. S. 420, 563 (dissenting opinion;. ""(dTTT
15iere is no attempt In this document, as some have assumed,
to be rid of religion; but, as with the Majority Opinion,
there is Involved only the attempt to keep the Oovemiraent
from becoming unduly enmeshed In It. Thus, this document
is in agreement with the Majority Opinion in that "The Estab
lishment Clause thus stands as an expression of principle
on the part of the Pounders of our Constitution that religion
Is too personal, too saci>ed, too holy, to permit its 'un
hallowed perversion' by a civil magistrate." (B, 10) He
is also in agreement that, "the history of man is insep
arable from the history of religion." (B. 12) Justice
Douglas continues his analysis of the Intent of the Plrst
Amendment :
By reason of the Plrft Amendment government Is com
manded "to have no interest in theology or ritual"
[McOowan V. Maryland, 366 tl. S. 420, 5643, for on those
mattera goverxmient must be neutral.
' Ibid. The Plrst
Amendment leaves the Ooverment in a posliion not of
hostility to religion but of neutrality. (D. 7)
Pew people doubt that the goverment should have little to
do with either theology or ritual, but this is a long way
from denying any kind of support at all to any religious
exercise whatfioevar. Even full govomraent neutrality to
theology and ritual, would not mean, as Justice Douglas
Infers, that the government must be completely neutral to
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all forms and expressions of religion. It is, in fact, ex-
trwaely questionable, if there is a shred of truth in the'
quotation from Justice Black given above, that complete
neutrality of the government with respect to religion is
even possible. If the history of man is inseparable from
the history of religion. It Is equally true that the history
of man is Inseparable from the history of government. The
history of government aside from the history of man Is mean
ingless and vice versa�as man goes, so goes his govemmentj
as government goes, so goes man. Religion and govenMient
cannot, therefore, be separated, for neither of them can be
separated from man�who Is essential to both and to whom
both
are essential. Father John J. Kavone, 8.J., expresses this
idea very well In an editorial In America;
Every cultxire is shaped by Its religious beliefs, so
that any error about man or Ood will corrtflpt not only
the religion but also the culture, for both religion and
culture depend for their perfection on a right knowledge
of man. A right knowledge of man is impossible without
a rlirtit knowledge of Ood. The measure of a culture,?herSfore7 is the measure of the truths of its religious
doctrines and the extent to whloh they are practiced.^
Bius, as Justice Douglas continues his discussion, it
rests
upon an unsound basis. He seems to have
read too much Into
the words of this dissenting opinion. It could be, however,
that though the small portion of this opinion given here
does
3john J. Mavone, S.J., "Teen-Agers and the Unknown
ood," America 1975435, June 30, 1962.
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not warrant the extensive theory of neutrality that Justice
Douglas has espoused, perhaps the major thrust of that
oplnionvmould so maintain�and even to the degree maintained
by Justice Douglas. Even if it should agree wholeheartedly
with him, however, the position still seems untenable on the
basis of relationships of both religion and government to
man. His discussion of the problem is not yet over, however.
He continues!
The philosophy is that the atheist or agnostic� the non-
believer� Is entitled to go his own way. The philosophy
is that if government Interferes in matters-spiritual, it
will be a divisive force. The Plrst Amendment teaches
that a goveimment neutral in the field of religion better
serves all religious Interests. (D. 7)
The tlx At of these statements concez>nlng the philosophy of
the Plrst Amendment is undeniably excellent. In the words of
Mr. Orover C. Bagby in The Christian Advocate: "Much as un
belief is to be deplored f z<om a religious point of view, free
dom to believe cannot really exist except as it is accompanied
by freedom to disbelieve."^ The non-believer has an unques
tionable right to disbelieve as suits him, and no act of
government must be permitted which will force the non-believer
to do any fozra of obeisance to a Qod In Whom he does not be
lieve. However, even granting the truth of this, the second
statement quoted above is only partly true. It Is true that
^Orover C. Bagby, "The Supreme Court and Prayer,"
The Chrlatlan Advocate, 6:11-12, August 16, 1962.
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If government Interferea in spiritual matters�like writing
prayers, be it admitted� it will be a divisive force. On the
other hand, it cannot be considered interference for the gov
ernment to recognise religion as a vital and doreinating
feree in the lives of the overwhelming majority of the people
whom it serves. Such recognition is merely an incontrever-
tible obsezvation, and to act in accordance with that obser
vation is but to act logically. The concluding statement of
this section, then, is doubtf\il in the way in which it is
meant. A certaiia astount of neutrality is absolutely neces-
sazT, for there must be no "taking of sides," but the strict
neutrality of which Justice Douglas speaks throughout this
document is inconsistent with the nature of man and of govern
ment, and is an untenable proposition. He has not established
that it is actually the purpose of the Firet Amendment to
pretend Qod's non-existence through neutrality, nor could he.
The very fact that the First Congress, which adopted the
Firet Amendment, also proceeded to set up the Congressional
and military chaplaincies is a strong testimony that such was
not the original intention of the Amendment. All that can
be said on the basis of the discussion so far, is that the
Sstabllshment Clause is to keep one form of religion fr<m be
coming sanctioned officially and thus dominant over all other
foms of religion; or of religion in general becoming so
strongly backed by official sanction that Irrellglon should
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fee persecuted. He has not established that goveranent must
abstain from any and all religious exercises�especially as
long as measures are taken, when such exercises are under-
taken� to assure dlssentere of their rights not to partici
pate. His argument appeare weak, but there is yet another
section to be discussed.
Consideretlon of Oompl leatIons. In discussing the so-
called Bverson Case, he points out that it "allowed taxpayer^'
money to be used to pay 'the bus fares of parochial school
pupils as a part of a generel pregrea under which' the
fares of pupils attending public and other schools were also
paid." (B. 7-8) !Ihls he feels to be counter to the Plrst
Amendment, for though it would help cei^ln needy children,
"by the same token, public funds could be used to satisfy
other needs of children in parochial schools� lunches, books,
and tuition being obvious examples." (D. 3) Iieo Pfeffer,
Director of the Commission on law and Social Action and 9en-
erel Counsel of the American Jewish Council, gives this
rether prevocative evaluation of the Bverson case decisions
What the Court said in the Everson case was that the
Amendment Imposes upon the federal and state governments
in the Iftiited States a mandate of neutrality not only
among ccmapeting faiths, but between religion and non-
religion. It may use its Instruments neither to aid
religion nor to injure it. In short, govenaient in the
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^ited States is secular and its power may be employed
only to further secular ends.''
It is interesting to note another view at this point:
It is really very hard to see how the Court can pro
ceed in opposite directions at the same tLiie If it ia
unconstitutional for a public body to reccnnmend a simple
prayer for voluntary use in the public schools, how can
it at the same time be constitutional to take public
funds for the siQ)port of sectarian el^entary education?^
This, of course, is exactly what Justice Doxiglas is saying
here in his Concurring Opinion. It would seem tr^xa the flavor
of this article, which appeared as an editorial in the Maz
arene magazine Herald of Hollneas, that its author is most
definitely against the prayer decision as well as the Sveraon
case, yet he little seems to suspect that should he have his
way, and the Everson decision be reversed, he would have re
moved the only complication which Justice Douglas sees in his
position�which is far more radical in its ramifications than
either the Everson case or the Sngel case! It is a rather
grimly humorous thing to observe the Implications of the
opinions of people who speak without fully analyzing all the
circiffiistances involved. Justice Douglas continues the dis
cussion of this ct^pllcatlon in his position by quoting trom
the dissention of Justice Rutledge, calling It "durable Plrst
5Leo Pfeffer, "Religion and the Court," C<^onweal,
76:417-22, July 27, 1962.
^"Ihe Supreme Court Paradox," Herald of Holiness,
51:12, August 15, 1962.
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Amendment philosophy" :
"The reasons underlying the Amendment's policy have not
vanished with time or diminished in force. How as when
it was adopted the price of religious freedom is double.
It is that the church and religion shall live both within
and upon that freedom. There cannot be freedom of reli
gion, safeguarded by the state, and intervention by the
church or its agencies in the state's domain or dependency
on its largesse. Madison's Remonstrance, Par. 6,8."
Here again Is basic agreement with the Majority Opinion, that
the purpose of the Pirst Amendment at its inception is the
purpose of the Pirst Amendment now. The observation that the
state cannot guarantee freedom of religion, if the church is
Interfering in the work of the state or receiving subsidies
from it is excellent. That the state cannot remain neutral
in relation to something it is supporting financially, is the
contention.
The great condition of religious liberty is that it be
maintained free from sustenance, as also from other inter
ferences, by the state. For when it comes to rest upon
that secular foundation it vanishes with the resting.
Id., Par. 7,8. Public money devoted to payment of reli
gious costs, educational or other, brings the quest for
�or&. It brings too the struggle of sect against sect for
the larger share or for any. . . . The end of such
strife cannot be other than to destroy the cherished
liberty. The dominating group will achieve the dominant
benefit; or all will embroil the state in their dis
sensions. (S. 8-9)
The truth of these observations is amply attested by history.
The unfortunate truth is, however, that it is not only re
stricted to the strife between religious sects, but also be
tween the religious section of society and the irreligious.
The non-believer will as readily take advantage of the believer
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and seek to subvert everyi;hlng preolous to him if he gets the
sanction of govemaentr-contemporary govenmients the world
over furnish grim testimony to this fact. The government
cannot maintain a strict neutrality of the nature described
throughout this dooimient without favoring the minority in
society� the nohbelievers . Government cannot refrain from
taking sides. It 1b> therefore, inextricably bound by the
basic philosophy of democratic government to take the majority
side in all areas not discriminatory against the minority.
This cannot be overemphasized in a society such as this.
On the basis of the discussion, therefore, it cannot be
aaXd that Justice Douglas has liqplicltly established his
position, ^ough it may be true that both logically and
la^llcltly he has established a relationship between the prac
tices of the New York schools and the openli^ of Congress and
of the 8\q>reme Court, he has not demonstrated that these things
are unconstitutional. He did present good discussion and his
citations were valid, but they were not sufficient in them
selves to substantially confirm his broad interpretation of
the Piret Amendment� that Congress must never, under any cir
cumstances, support any kind of religious exercise. If the
Regents' preyer is unconstitutional, it must be domonstreted
to be so on other grounds than that of governmental finances.
If the prayer by the Marshal of the Supreme Court is uncon
stitutional, it must be so demonstrated to be on other greunds
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than that of governmental finances. If the prayer by the
Marshal of the Supreme Ooturt is vinconatltutlonal, it must be
so demonstrated to be on other grounds than that the Marshal
is a government employee. If the institutions of the congres
sional and militai>y chaplaincies are unconstitutional, they
mxist be demonstrated to be so on other grounds than the sole
fact that the salaries of these men are paid from government
funds.
Conclusion (P. 9)
Justice Poiiglas concludes his Concurring Opinion with
these words! "What New York does with this prayer is a break
with that tradition." (That Is, the tradition of the First
Amendment as discussed by Justice Rutledge in his dissenting
Opinion to the Bverson case. ) "I therefore Join the Court
in reversing the Judgment below." Though this seems to be
unwarranted by the arguments, it must not be lightly dis
missed. Hh9 results are the same regai^lass of the reasoning.
It is believed, however, that the discussion here should point
out that the arguments used by Justice Douglas are not con
sistent and shoiad not prove dangerously effective in future
cases .
II. EVALUATION
In spite of the conclusions reached in this study
concerning the Concurring Opinion of Justice William 0.
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DoiigiaB, nothing said In this paper should he construed In
any way to minimise the Importance of this document. It Is
the official opinion of a Oilted States Supreme Court Justice,
and as such Is as Important as any Dissenting Opinion, to
which. It must be noted. Justice Douglas twice made recourse.
The official opinion of any Supreme Court Justice may be used
as valid documentation of a position jn a court trial and It
should be so, for It Is the opinion of an expert In his field.
It Is, therefore, with very valid concern that people
ask "Wiere does the program of sectilarlzatlon end when once
It has begun? And If It Is coBq;>lalned that the Inclusion of
a prayer favors belief as against disbelief. Is not the ban
ning of prayer equally taking sides, favoring disbelief
against bellef?''7 Thus, from the religious point of view, this
decision appears as a most ominous and dangerous trend. Such
stat^aents as the following are frequent:
The wav<; of Indlgimtlon over the court's decision was
bathed in the fear that It had opened a new precedent
toward secularization of American culture. The reaction
was probably intensified by a separate concurring opinion
issued by Justice William 0. Douglas ... � Christianity
Today"
Many religious leaders have pointed out that the Court
decision was not against Ood, not against prayer, not evaa
^"Prayer In School," The War Cry, 42:2, August 4, 1962.
^"Church-State Separation: A Serpentine Wall?"
Christlsaalty Today, 6:29-31, July 20, 1962.
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against prayer In the publlo schools ... We hope their
evaluation of the decision Is correct.
But Justioe William 0. Douglas In his concurrent opin
ion ... � The (airlstlan Herald"
The radical approach taken by Mr. Justice Douglas in
his concurring opinion belles the American tradition of
impartial Justice under law. � Rev. Francis Conklln, S.J.***^
Other similar expression of foreboding are numerous and easy
to find. Mo one. In fact, to the knowledge of the researcher,
ever actually came out in full support of the position held
by Justice Douglas, though many agreed with the Majority
Opinion. Some consolation to the religious element of society
can be fo\md In the observation by Ohristlanity Today: "Most
Informed Washington observers were convinced, however, that
none of the other eight Justices share the extreme separetion
view held by DotJglas."^!
Finally, there must be one final observation made:
Though this position is viewed as radical and dangerous to
religion in the Iftilted States, though the precedents established
by this opinion are considered unfortunate and undesirable
in the extreme, nothing� let that be repeated�nothing in
this paper is Intended to cast the slightest asperelon upon
^Daniel A. Poling, "One Hatlon tfader Ood," The Christian
Hereld, 85:30-31, September, 1962.
^^Frencls Conklln, "Preyers in the Public Schools,"
Vital Speeches, 28:645-649, August I5, 1962.
11 "Church-State Separation: "Serpentine Wall?" loc.
clt.
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Justice Douglas personally, politically, religiously, legally,
nor in any other way. As a Justice of the Supreme Court of
the Uhited States of America, Justice William 0. Douglas cob-
manda nothing hut the highest esteem of this researcher- His
opinion reviewed here is considered to be of high quality and of
no little amount of merit� though this is not either to be con
strued as acceptance thereof. The author of this thesis dis
agrees wholeheartedly�yet with all respect�with the views of
Justice Douglas as expressed in his Concurring Opinion in the
Engel V. Vitale case under consideration here. Let the fol
lowing stand as the fullest expression of these sentiments:
Criticism of the high Court is an old American ouston
and a healthy one in a democracy- What is unhealthy is
unlnfomed vilification of the Court, and in recent years
we have read a lot of nonsense from the pens of emotional
and irrational foes of the Warren Court. . . . Some
criticism is better than none at all, but it should be
rational criticism that pays due respect to the dignity
and importance of the Supreme Court In the framework of
American life.^^
^2john B. Sheerin, C.3.P., "The Ban on Public School
Prayer," Catholic World, 195:261-65, August, 1962.
OHAPTBH IV
ANALYSIS OF THE DISSENTIKQ OPINION
When a Justice of the Siiprerae Court disagrees with the
majority of his colleagues concerning a case, he may publish
his dissenting opinion when the majority opinion Is published.
This dissent, becoming a part of the official transcript of
the decision may then be used In the argianents of lawyers In
future cases. Though the dissenting opinion Is autcHoatlcally
overruled by the majority of Justices, It Is not to be dis
missed, for It must be considered the opinion of an expert In
the field of law�notwithstanding the fact that he is an ex
pert in disagreement with other experts. It has already been
noted how the use of the dissenting opinions of two different
cases (McOowan v. Maryland and Everson v. Board of Education)
was very well effected by Justice Douglas in his concurring
opinion in the case of Engel v. Vitale under consideration in
this study. This Dissenting Opinion of Justice Potter Stewart,
then, is significant and demands the close scrutiny and care
ful analysis given the Majority and Concurring Opinions in
this case.
I. STUDY
As a literary contribution, this little document is not
a great work, but its message is clear to the careful reader.
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A very short �ork� it is hut six pages in length in the offi
cial transcript, fully three of which are footnotes. The
arguaentation ia not illogical, and is based mostly upon the
other two <9inions. The language is simple, the tone, unbe-
comlngly irritated�a decided drawback. Reference is made
to other cases, but there is not the dependence upon then
that is found in the doc\raent of Justice I>ouglas. Qbfortunately,
it is true that, "more attention has been paid to the indi
vidual opinion of two Justices (William 0. Douglas, who
concurred, and Potter Stewart, who dissented) than to the
actual decision!"^ It is, therefore, of possibly greater
significance because of the popular reaction to the decision
than any actual legal importanoe it mif^At have. In either
reapeet, however, it is a valuable document i^loh deserves
earnest study. Por the purposes of sttu^, therefore, the fol
lowing outline of the docuBMnt will be followed throughout tliis
chapter:
IMTRODUCnOH 1
I. Exceptions with the �teJorlty Opinion 1-2
IX. Sumplea of Rellcloas � Traditions 2-6
III. Reasons for Dissent 6
COIWLCSION 6
-^Raymond P. Jennings, "Is the Supreme Court Right?"
Btemity, 13 �12-15/, SeptMber, 1962.
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Introduotlon (S. l)
By way of Introduction, Justioe Stewart gives simply
one short paragraph of baokground to the case, plus a succinct
analysis of the Majority Opinion and his own disagreement}
A local school board In New York has provided that
those pi^lls who wish to do so may Join In a brief prayer
at the beginning of each day, acknowledging their de
pendence upon Gtod and asking His blessing upon them and
upon their parents, their teachers, and their country.
(S. 1)
The language used In this opening sentence Is superbly slsqple
yet wonderfully expressive of exactly what Is meant. "...
those pupils who wish to do so ma� Join In a brief prayer
. . ."�how better could It be expressed that the choice of
whether or not to say the prayer belongs to the student? It
should be noticed, too, that the pronoun "His" referring to
Ood, Is capitalized�a simple courtesy to Deity often over
looked even In the wrltli�s of theologians. "The Court to
day decides that In permitting this brief non-denomlnatlonal
prayer the school board has violated the Constitution
of the
United States," continues Justioe Stewart. Again the language
used Is forceful and direct, saying exactly what Is desired.
Though not disrespectful, there Is nonetheless a flavor
about
It that Is strongly Indicative of a contrary position. It Is
uimlstakable�even were this passage unmarked as such.
It
could only come from the dissenting viewpoint.
It Is, then,
fully expected when he says quite simply,
"I think this de
cision Is wrong."
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fhe sueclnotnes* and style of this document are well
used to create the desired reaction within the reader. I^e
emphasis is upon the children, and this is his point of view
throughout the document, where he isn't dealing in refutation
of the argiments of the Majority Opinion. A hint of frus
tration appears here and there, hut especially ia the sentence
which reads: "^e Court today decides that in permitting this
brief non-denc�inational prayer the school board has violated
the Constitution of the United States." He continues, "I
think this decision is wrong." (S. 1} Nothing here could be
pointed to as indicating exasperation, yet the entire sentence
seems to be saying, "I don't untderstand how a group of Supreme
Court Justices can say that this inoffensive little prayer
coiad violate the United States Constitution!" His language
is allele, yet subtle. It is also misleading. He says that
the Court declared that the school board had violated the
Constitution in permitting the use of the prayer, when the
actual decision was not really directed against the school
board at all, but against the New York Board of Regents; it
was not primarily against permitting the use of the prayer,
but against the fact that it was composed by a government
agency. The bluntness of the last statement and the hardness
of the langxwge, are undoubtedly contributing factors to the
misunderstanding irtiich arose concerning the decision. He
could have said, "I think this decision is in error," or even
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'mistaken, ' but 'wrong' seems harsh. All of this seems to
set a belligerent feeling from the outset which carries on
into the rest of the document. The discussion of his objec
tions to the Majority Opinion are similar.
Exceptions With the Ma.1ority Opinion. (S. 1-2)
^The Court does not hold, nor could it," this section
begins, "that Mew York, has interfered with the free exercise
of anybody's religion." (S. 1) This is basically true, but it
does not take into consideration the discussion by Justice
Black on that vers possibility (B. 9), when he says, "This is
not to say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a par
ticular form of religious worship do not Involve coercion of
such individuals.*^^ Here, and in the succeeding observations,
is a very definite admission that the possibility of coer
cion did exist. Justice Ooviglas took cognizance of this fact,
and admitted the possibility, making it a unanimous agreement
among the six majority voters, that there may have been some
element of coercion�of violation of the free exercise of the
petitioners' religious sympathies�and this makes questionable
the whole line of reasoning here. He continues his discussion,
however:
For the state courts have made clear that those who object
to reciting the prayer must be entirely free of any com
pulsion to do so, including any "embarrassments and pres
sures.
" Cf . West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Bamette, 319"^S. bl4. (JTTJ
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It la at this paint of "embarrassments and pressures" that the
question arises, however, as to whether there might be some
violation of the freedoms of the Individuals, for, as the edi
tors of Time Magazine note:
Ihe right of free exercise carries with It the right
not to participate In any sort of religious activity, and
It Is begging a point to say that Mew York schoolchildren
were free to leave the classroom during the recitation
of the prayer. Sven the children of the five Long
Islanders who brought the suit remained In their class
rooms, because, as one parent ejq>lalned, their parents
did not want them to become "pariahs" among their school
mates. ^
This, of course. Is the very thing that Justice Douglas says
In his discussion of this aspect of the Issue. "7ew adults,"
he points out, "let alone children, would leave our courtroom
or the Senate or the House, while those prayers are being
given." (D. 6) The failure of Justice Stewart to recognize
these factors In the arguments of his colleagues weakens his
overall argument, for the question c^es to mind, that If
he missed the point here, may he not have missed It elsewheret
Such a question may or may not be valid, but It Is, In any
case himan. The argument would have been much stronger If he
had noted that the Court remarked as to the possibility of
the violation of the Individual freed^s, but that none of
the state courts had so found, and that the Majority Opinion
Itaelf, was ultimately constrained to leave such a consideration
2"T0 Stand As A Quarantee," Time. 80:7-9, July 6, 1962.
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and make Its decision upon another basis entirely. Hie latter
faet he does, of course, point out; but the force with which
he asserts that the Court "does not hold, nor could it," that
there is any interference with the rights of the individuals,
is not a worthy observation, for it overlooks the facts. He
goes on to say, however, that, "!Rie Court says that in pemlt
tlng schoolchildren to say this simple preyer, the Mew York
authorities have established ^an official religion.'" Again,
Justice Stewart is misstating the actual contentions of the
Majority (pinion. The Court does not say that the violation
lies in "pemlttlng school children to say this simple preyer,"
the Court says that the violation lies in the fact that it Is
"a part of a religious program cazvled on by government,"
(B. 4) and because "it is no part of the business of govern
ment to compose official preyers." (B. 4) Fortunately, how
ever, his observations are not all so Inaccurate. The next
paregreph of his discussion is quite good.
With all respect, X think the Court has misapplied a
great constitutional principle. I cannot see how an
*offIclal religion" is established by letting those who
want to say a preyer say it. On the contrary, I think
that to deny the wish of these school children to Join
in reciting this preyer is to deny them the opportunity
of sharing in the spiritual heritage of our Nation. (B. l;
This discussion is most relevant to his entire argument. The
fact that there is little or no coercion Involved, to him is
basic. He is looking at the issue from the children's stand
point, and herein lies fundamental difference with the Court,
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which looks at the case from the point of the activities of
the state govemsient. It Is a difference of perspective, as
will be seen throughout. The fact that he sees here the denial
to children of a right to say a prayer Is a fundamental con-
cewi to him, as to many who Joined with him In the popular
reaction to the decision. This Is not a fallacious approach
to the problaa, but the fact that the approach is made with
apparent disregaird for the fact that he is looking at it from
a different angle than the Court, is in danger of fallacious
evaluation of the Court's opinion.
The argument presented in this paragraph is consistent
with the previous arguments�even if it is not consistent with
the Majority Opinion. The basis for the fears expressed in
the popular reaction is seen here in the sentiments "I cannot
see how an "official religion" is established by letting those
who want to say a prayer say it." Nor can ajiyone else, it
would seem, and this is the big reason why so great an objec
tion arose, but the element of perspective must be blamed for
the confusion. There is also another very basic observation .
to be made here, and that is the Indefinite article ia the
first sentence: "letting those who want to say a prayer say
iti" and the very specific reference to "this prayer" in the
second sentence. The connection between the two is fundamental
�Justice Stewart very definitely sees in this decision, the
denial to Hew York schoolchildren of the opportunity to pray
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In schools. To him to deny the right to say this prayer Is
the same as to deny them the right to say a prayer, or aiy
prayer and thus to deny them "the opportunity of sharing In
the spiritual heritage of our Nation." This Is the reason
why the discussion of the history of establishments In England
and In the colonies, "throws no light for me on the Issue be
fore us In this case." (S. S) He continues with an observa
tion which is basic to understanding his entire approach!
Por we deal here not with the establishment of a state
church, which would, of course, be constitutionally
iaqpermissible, but with whether school children who mmt
to begin their day by Joining in prayer must be prohibited
from doing so. (S. 2)
This statement more than any other, can imdoubtedly be
charged with the responsibility for the great misunderstanding
which arose concerning the decision, for the element of per
spective has more bearing here than elsewhere and is completely
overlooked by the average observer. It Is here that people
came to the opinion that the decision forbade all preyer in
the schools, which is not the case. The statement Is most
unfortunate, especially in view of the fact that it is
totally unnecessary to his position as a whole. The real
weight of the argument comes out nearer the end of thla
paragraph in the statement!
What is relevant to the issue here is not the history
of an established chureh in sixteenth century England or
eighteenth century America, but the hlstoxy of the reli
gious traditions of our people, reflected In countless
practices of the institutions and officials of our govern
ment. (S. 2)
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The sagacity and pertinence of this statement Is all but totally
obscured by the passion and clarity of the foregoing sentencts
and paragraphs�yet this Is the real basis of his position- -
this Is the real ground for dissent. IXnfortunately, It has
taken Justice Stewart a paga-and-a-half to get to his actual
position, and then he states It so badly that without careful
study of the Implications of the document. It Is lost as a mare
transitional sentence. It Is, on the contrary, the crux of
his entlra argument! What he Is saying. In essence. Is that
the Important consideration Is not what happened befora the
yirat Amendment was wrltten--not even tthat was essentially In
the mind of Its author at the time of writing�but rather the
Important consideration is, "How has the Flrat Amendment been
Interpreted all the way down through the hlatory of our nation,
since Its writing?" He then proceeds to prove that the Inter
pretation which has been made throughout the history of our
nation is consistent with the action taken by the Hew York
Board of Regents. Justice Stewart would, it seems, agrae mora
closely with the following Interpratatlon of Flrat Amendment
philosophy than the other Justices:
The First Amendment is certainly more than a list of
pious platitudes for legislators but less than an ,}>:30-
lute code that admits no exceptions. The Con3tltutlon
was designed not as a static document but as a living
law and it ?ms evolved from generation to generation on
American soil. To read It correctly, we have to read it
not in the context of "established" state churches of
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early America but In the context of 1962 America, where a
ban on school preyer gravely disturbs the peace and haraony
of the local and national community.-^
Implications of such an Interpretation are manifold. The
reasoning, however, is that what was true then, is not necessar
ily true now�directly opposing the sentiments of the majority,
which are most aptly expressed by the opinion of Justice Rut
ledge quoted by Justice Douglas (D. 8), "The reasons underlying
the Amendment's policy have not vanished with time or diminished
In force." With this difference of viewpoint. Justice Stewart
begins to Illustrate the many ways In the tradition of the
lAilted States, that the goverranent has taken stands on reli
gious Issues.
Examples of Rfcll^ioua Traditions (3. 2-6)
The gist of this section ia that it points out that
since John Marshall there has been a religious act carried on
in the Supreme Court itself; since the First Congress, there
hf's been a rellgloua tet cari�led on in the Houses of Congress;
since Qeorge Washington, each* of the Presidents has appealed
to Ood for help; since 1931, "The Star Spangled Banner,? whiol*
contains religious sentiments, has been our National Anthem;
since 1954, the Pledge of Allegiance has contained the words
"under Ood"; since 1952, the President Is called upon annually
3john B. Sheerin, "The Ban on Public School Prayer,"
Catholic World, 195:261-65, August, I962.
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to proclain a Kitlonal Day of Prayer; aince l865,the words
"In aod We Trust" have been Impressed xipon our coins. (S.2-6)
These are all religious In nature, all prescribed by Congress
or some other official body or Individual. "Countless similar
examples could be listed," he adds, "but there Is no need to
belabor the obvious." He Is right. His point Is made, but nd
very well, for It must be abstracted by Implication. All of
these acts are of a religious nature, and what was done In
New Toi^c was similar. None of these other acts have ever been
considered unconstitutional, nor should this one. His foot
note to this statement Is of significance here:
I am at a loss to understand the Court's unsupported
Ipse dixit that these official expressions of religious
faith in and reliance upon a Supreme Being "bear no true
resemblance to the unquestioned religious exercise that
the State of New Terk has sponsored In this Instance."
I^. 14, footnote 21] .
This point Is very well made. There Is a direct resemblance,
he asserts, between what has been traditionally done and what
New Toz4c has done here. The unfortunate return of the frus
trated, belligerent tone In the footnote Is detracting from
the argument, for he Is almost sarcastic when he says:
I can hardly think that the Court means to say that the
PlMt Amendment Imposes a lesser restriction upon the
Federal Oovemment than does the Fourteenth Amendment
upon the States. Or Is the (^aurt suggesting that the
Constitution permits Judges and Congressmen and Presi
dents to Join In prayer, but prohibits school children
from doing so? (S. 6}
Small wonder that there was a popular reaction to the declsl* ,
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when a Supreme Court Justice confuses the Issue with such
unnecessary statements with such broad Implications! In this
section, then. It has been pointed out that Justice Stewart has
substantiated a good point, but the point In only Implied, never
stated directly. His position Is strong but stated weakly.
Reasons Por Dissent (S. 6)
The unfortunate element In this section Is not what Is
said. By putting hla conclusions forwa�l In the first person,
he obscures the real basis for them. He says:
I do not believe that this Court, or the Congress, or
the President has by the actions and practices I have men
tioned established an "official religion" In violation
of the Constitution. And I do not believe the State of
Me^ York has done so In this case. (S. 6)
How much stronger wovild have been the argument If he had put
It thus:
Such actions as those of the Court, of the Congress,
and of the President i^ave never been Interpreted as estab
lishing an "official religion" In violation of the Consti
tution. Hor should the actions of the State of Hew York
In this case.
The case has been decidedly weakened by arguing from his own
Individual point of view rather than from the point of view of
all those whose Interpretations he has cited.
Conclusion (g. 6)
In two words, "I dissent." Justice Stewart concludes
his opinion. His dissent Is really well founded, but stated
weakly, with elements of frustration which detract fram the
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force of his position and lend to popular confusion. It Is
lamentable that such a strong position should be thus made
virtually Impotent by subjective argumentation and obvious
misrepresentation of the opposing view.
II. SVALUATIOH
The Importance of this docvuaent Is heightened by Its
faults. In fact. It might not be out of order to say that Its
faults are more Important than Its strengths, for they are more
well-known. The faults of this document are basically two In
number] (l) It makes a grlevlous misrepresentation of the
purpose and meamlng of the Majority Opinion, and (2) It pre
sents Its az^uments with an element of frustration which all
but obscures the real thrust of the opinion Itself. Because
of the first of these faults, there arose a great popular re
action to the decision which proves, upon careful study of the
actual text of the Majority Opinion, to be totally unwarranted.
Frequently, during his discussion, he chaises that the Court
has prohibited children from joining In prayer, which Is not
at all the case�which Is carefully made clear In the text of
the Majority Opinion. It Is, however, not simply the fact that
Justice Stewart disagrees with the Court that causes difficulty,
but that he disagrees In a critical and wholly subjective way.
It Is his attitude which Is frequently reflected In the pop
ular reaction. It Is this attitude, coupled with the extreme
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position of Justice Douglas that made this case the great bone
of contention It became. Had the real point of this opinion
been discussed with more objectivity, placing the emphasis
upon the paints rather than the opinions, the document would
have been valuable for its argments and not alone for the
reactions it engendered. Ihe arguments implied in the opinion
are excellent and of tremendous value, but they are presented
in such a weak way that they are all but obscured. This is
treglc. This argument, stated simply, is that the traditional
Interpretation of the first Amendment has permitted just such
actions as that taken by Mew York State, and that there is no
real reason to go counter to that firmly established tradition
in this case. How lamentable that this fine discussion is all
but lost in the tone and attitude of its delivi^Ty.
CHAPTER V
CCMPARISOMS, SUGGESTED SOLOTIOMS, AND CONCLUSIONS
The parpoae of thl� study, briefly restated, la to
analyse the Engel v. Vitale decision and Its Implications, In
an effort to settle s^e of the furor which arose In Its wake,
and also to discover Its possible bearing upon future liti
gation In similar cases. The foregoing chaptere of this
thesis have been devoted to the analysis of each of the doc
uments Involved In the decision; and It Is the object of this
chapter to compare these documents, and to discuss severel
suggentlens concemlng the manner In which the preblems
relsed by this decision might be met. The chapter will con-
elude with a number of observations by the researcher concern
ing the bearing of this decision upon the philosophy of Church
State separetion la the United States, and with a few sug
gestions for further study. There will be some need threugh-
out the chapter to make reference to the three documents
under consideretlon.
I. COMPARISONS AND PRECEDENT
^e Itejerlty Opinion takes the standpoint that the
Establishment Clause means that goverzment must at least stay
out of the business of writing preyers. Ttiia viewpoint, very
consistent with what It demonstretes to have been the probable
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opinion of the author of the AaenifiBentj must mean that the
Ragents' prayer is definitely forbidden along with any other
prayers composed by either federal or state institutions.
There is some question about what the decision means when it
makes reference to programs "of govermentally sponsored reli
gious activity." (B. 8) Does it mean that these programs
are likewise unconstitutional, or that when programs are
carried on, the goverment must not write prayers to be used
in them? Biis question is left unanswered, though certain
indications seem to lead to the conclusion that the Court is
open to discuss it further if similar cases are brought before
it. Compared with the position of Justice Douglas, it does
not seem nearly so radical, for it does not express the things
he expresses; nor does it, however, deny that they might be
considered unconstitutional if litigation were asked for.
Justice Douglas indicates a basic agreement with the interpre
tation of the First Amendment, in that it must be interpreted
on the b&sis of the original intent of its author though he
uses a different avenue of approach. To him the question is
one of financial support, whereas to the majority of the
Justices, it is one of actual legislated establishment.
Justice Douglas explicates that which the Majority Opinion
can possibly be inferred to mean. The opinion of Justice
Stewart places the question in an entirely different light,
for it shows that this interpratatlon of the Flrat Amendment
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Is not traditional. He implies that the decision is estab
lishing a new interpretation, counter to the old interpreta
tion. This, to him, is unnecessary. Mo one thought that
religion was established under the old interpretation, nor
should any one so consider the Mew York preyer case which is
of a nature similar to the many prectices of the state and
federel governments.
It is to be seen, therefore, that though the only
thing which can definitely be stated to have been forbidden
by the decision is the Mew Yoz4c Regents' preyer, a number of
other prectices�in school and out�have ccwie into question.
Thus, sueh foreboding statements as that of Billy Qreham are
not utterly unwarrented. He said:
Pollowed to its logical conclusion preyers can not be
said in Congress, chaplains will be taken from the armed
forces and the President will not place his hand on the
Bible when he takes office. ^
Episcopal Bishop James A. Pike, one of the foremost opponents
of the decision expresses a similar sentiment:
The Court's ruling deconsecreted the nation, and
created a state religion that of secularism which is
a perepective on life and reality, taken on faith, which
includes men and things but not Ck>d; time and history,
but not eternity.^
lAa quoted in New York Times, June 26, 1962, p. 17.
2As quoted in "Roundup on Preyer Case," America,
107:541-42, July 28, I962.
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Thus, tha unexpressed Iraplloatlons of the Majority Opinion,
if interpreted in the light of the Concurring Opinion of Justice
Douglas, could well establish a new interpretation of the
First Amendment which could ultimately lead to the attempted
complete segregation of all forms of religion from government.
Should this be the case, as some suggest, the only conceivable
altezTiative would be to amend the Constitution to provide
opportunity for the cooperation between Oiurch and State to
which the average iMividual is accustomed. Mot a few, how
ever, question if this is really the cor^^ect interpretation,
for many feel that only devotional practices in the public
schools have been affected by the decision. Though to be
sure, this interpretation is broad enough, it la not nearly
so broad and all-inclusive as that of Billy Qraham and Bishop
Pike. The Siinday School Times expresses this fear thus:
This one court decision is, in Itself, not so dramat
ically Important. What la Important is the direction
pointed by this ruling�toward the ultimate elimination
of religion as traditionally practiced in the public
schools of the Itolted States. 3
Similarly, the magazine Vital Christianity, official organ of
the Church of Qod, remarks warily:
One of the reasons for the big excitement is the fact
that this adds one more step in a series of steps that
seems to be taking us Inexorably down the road to a totally
secularized education system.^
BBelden Mankus, "How G&n Christians Meet the Prayer
Ruling?" The Sunday School Times, 104:1, August 25, 1962.
4 "Ood and the Public Schools," Vital ChrlstUnlty,
82:5, July 22, 1962.
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Amerloa calls the decision the "Black Monday Decision* because
It was handed down on the Monday that Justice Black was cele
brating his twenty-fifth anniversary on the Court. TtMa �dl-
torlal says that It "will ultimately be urged as a precedent
to put a stop to all prayer and Bible reading In the nation's
public school system."^ ^at the case will Indeed be "urged
as a precedent' to stop other activities may be seen In the
statement by Boris Smolar in the American Examiner, a Jewish
newspaper:
The Regents Prayer la the most inoffensive, most non-
denomlnatlonal, most; innocuous religious practice imagin
able ... If its recitation In the public school is un
constitutional, there is no logical way of upholding the
recitation of the Lord's Prayer, which comes from^the
religious teachings of one particular faith . . .�
Whatever else may be true about the prayer case, therefore,
at least this much is patent, that It will be urged as a pre
cedent in similar cases in an attempt to remove any and all
expression of religion from the schools and possib-y even
from all public life. It is not to be denied that this may
not have been the original Intent of the participating Jus
tices, but it is a precedent which the opponents of these
forms of religious practices may be expected to use. Thus,
5"Black Monday Decision," America, 107:^56, July 7,
1962.
^Borls Smolar, "Spotting the National Trends." Amer
ican Examiner, July 12, I962.
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viirlous suggestions have been proposed in an effort to over
come the possible dire results if such a trend towai?d secular
ization either of the schools or of the entire government
were established. It will be pertinent to give some consider
ation to a few of these suggestions in this study.
II. SUOOESTED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM
Though many other st:�ggestions have been made, the moat
common ways suggested of attempting to overcome the decision,
are three* (l) a constitutional amendment; (2) establishment
of parochial schools; and (3) periods of silent meditation,
which may be used for prayer, if the individual student is so
inclined. These will be discussed In that order-
Svggosted Qanstltutlonal Amendments
For the most part, sxiggested amendments to the Consti
tution have come from those persons and institutions which
feel that the decision of this case amounts to the actual
secularization of government and/or the schools. Many and
varied have been their emphases, but ;all have attempted to
prevent the ftaflllment of what is seen to be an evil trend.
Desirable as it might be to analyze and discuss the many sug
gested amendments, it cannot be considered as a part of the
scope of this study. What is pertinent here is whether any
amendment is necessary or advisable. Naturally, before any
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amendaent In particular could be conaideared, one wovad need
to know what it should aay. This ig to say, that no step can
be taken in that direction, until it is absolutely certain
what rights, freedoms, or cherished privileges are being or
have been Jeopardised by this or subsequent decisions. There
must, then, be certain general areas covered by an amendment,
and it must be decided Just irtiat these areas are and how they
can best be safe-guarded. Along these lines, an editorial
in America magazine makes some very astute obseirvations con
cerning what a proposed amendment would need to dot
If any amendment is to be seriously considered, it
should be one that clarifies the two inherent ambiguities
which presently exist in the First Amendment.
One is the ambiguity of whether the religious clause
is one guai^ntee (of religious liberty) with two corre
lative restraints on goverment action (of setting up a
state church and/or of prohibiting worship); or whether
there are two separate, separable, and sraetimes con
flicting limitations on govezxmient, each of which may be
treated independently of the other. . . .
The other ambiguity resides in the specific meaning of
the no-establishment clause itself. Here there are three
cuirrent and conflicting theories. One maintains that the
clause erects an impregnable wall of separation" be
tween govenuaent and religion so that neither can assist,
favor or even recognize the other. This is the stand
taken by the American Civil Liberties IJhion.
A second position asserts that the clause ought to be
taken in a strictly literal sense, to mean only that
Congress nay not establish a state religion. And finally,
the third theory admits that the no-establishment clause
has meaning beyond the mere literal prohibition, but does
not go so far as to erect a wall of separation. Rather,
it recognizes an area of interrelationships between
government and religion, controlled, for the most part,
by popular customs and mutually agreeable compromises
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and regulated, in ;tum, by contmon regard for the rights
of conscience. Tkla, we could say, is realistic and
historically the traditional meaning of the controversial
clause . '
The problems presented here are tremendously significant. It
would seem from the discussion in the Majority Opinion on page
nine of the official transcript, that the two clauses are in
terpreted by the present Justices of the Supreme Court, at
least, as being two separate and sometimes conflicting limita
tions on government, for as Justioe Black observes, "Although
these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they for
bid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon
religious freedom." (B. 9) The second ambiguity of which he
speaks is not nearly so clear in the opinions of this case.
To be sure, the position of Justice Douglas is very clearly in
aligranent with the first of the three theories cited, for
he definitely believes that government must be strictly neutral
in regards to religion, and that there must be, seemingly, no
intercourse between them at ell. None of the documents could
be said to maintain the second viewpoint, nor do most of the
analysts of this case. Justice Stewart's Opinion can un
doubtedly be placed in the third category, recognizing areas
of interrelationships. The position of the Majority Opinion,
however, is open to question. Perhaps the majority of the
7 "a Prayer Amendment?" America, 107 � 685, September 8,
1962.
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Justices would not care to be placed with Justice Poiaglas in
the first category, in spite of the fact that Justice Black
speaks of a "wall of separation," for it can not be demonstrated
that this is meant to be as absolute as it may be interpreted.
The position is too unclear in this regard, for it is greatly
obscured by a vague metaphor. It is, therefore, quite uiipre-
dictable as to how the Justices will be inclined to adjudi
cate future cases of a similar nature, and one cannot cate
gorise the Justices in this regard on the strength of this
one case above, tor this very reason, it seems definitely
premature at this time to be seriously considering a Consti
tutional Amendment. It takes a two- thirds majority vote in
both the House of Representatives and in the Senate followed
by ratification by three -fo\urths of the states to approve an
amendment.^ This alone would seem sufficient to cause one to
hesitate before taking such a drastic move. Of greater sig
nificance, however, is the fact that "a comprehensive insight
into the Supreme Court's views on church-state separation can-
not ... be drawn merely from this narrow strip of decision.
It seems, therefore, most advisable to find some other method
�The new York Times, June 27, 1962, p. 20.
9 "Supreme Court Prayer Bans Where Will It Lead?"
Christianity Today, 6:25-26, July 20, 1962.
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of countering the probleia, for. In the words of Rsbbl Arthur
Gilbert t
It seems clear that. In our pluralistic society, at a
time when the ghetto walls are now crumbling significantly,
it is the obligation -particularly of religious leaders
--to explore creatively, in trust and confidence threugh
dialogue, the most satisfactory living an^mgements we
can find, before recourse is had to the secular power of
legislation or litigation. Otherwise, we shall have
warring oampa Involved in ballot-counting conflict.
Neither religion nor the public weal will gain in that
cireiBBstance .
Suggested Parochial Schools
The suggestions that the various religious denominations
might be forced to turn to the establishment of parochial
school systems seem to come frem those who see in the decision,
primarily a threat to the schools, though not necessarily to
the goverement as a whole. One of the best expressions of
this possibility is that of John C. Bennett in the magazine
Christianity and Crisis �
If the Court in the name of religious liberty tries to
keep a lid on religious expression and teaching both in
the public school and also In connection with experiments
that involve co-operetion with the publlo school, it will
drive all religious comunlties t� the establishment of
parochial schools, much against the will of mai�r and to
the great detriment of the public schools and probably
of the quality of all education. l-*-
10�Lettere About an Editorial," America, 107�774-79,
September 22, 1962.
llJohn C. Bennett, "Absolutism in the Supreme Court,"
Ohristlanity and Crisis, 22:135, August 6, 19^2.
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Similar expressions have come from various quarters. This
implies, however, that most people see parochial school
systems as being divisive and sub- standard. Nonetheless, there
is seen a definite need for the inclusion of religious instruc
tion with general education. One of the reasons for this is
well expressed by the National Council of Churches:
The principle of separation of church and state must
be observed and the rights of minorities be respected.
But this . . . need not and must not prevent forms of
public-school recognition of the role of religion as
viewed by the vast majority of pftrents andoother American
citizens.
Another reason for this need is expressed by Dr- Ralph W.
Sockman, when he says: "Too many of our homes have too little
prectice of preyer to teach it and too many of our
churches
have too little hold on the children to reach them.
'^3 Ufe
Magazine views the problem from a slightly different angle:
The decision was ... a sharp reminder to parents
that they cannot expect the public schools to
take care
of religiouTeducatlon of their children- -a responsibility
which tlo many Protestants are all too willing to let
handle If the decision should result in^SS^^StSiSvS'pJit.stint efforts at religious education,
it will have done some good.-'-^
It is such attempts at religious education by Protestants,
however, that Mr- Bennett felt were being jeopardized by
these
12"t|)roar Over School Preyer," U. S. Hews, 53S42-44,
July 9, 1962.
13a. quoted in The New York Times, July 9>
1962, p. 51.
l^"Paredoxes in Legal Logic
" Life, 53^4, July 13, 1962.
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Supreme Court decisions- His position Is that when Protestants
attempt such efforts of cooperation between religion and the
schools, they are defeated; and for this reason, Protestants
will begin to consider more seriously establishing their own
parochial sr^hools. !Ihe feeling Is by no means unlvereal
among Protestants as yet, but It Is seriously being dlscussed-
On the other side of the issue is the position of Mr. Oliver
G. Wilson, an advocate of "released time." Iki writes:
We believe morels need not be detached from the pub
lic school system. We believe that stealing, false wit
ness, dishonesty, unchastlty are sin� the public schools
should so declare. There are many things that are right
and some things that are wrong. This should be the
thread that runs through the whole of the educational
system. ^5
Possibly one of the most acceptable alternatives to the
establishment of parochial schools was suggested by Mr.
William J. Butler, attorney for the petitioners in the case
under consideretlon:
We must distinguish between teaching religion and ^
teaching about religion. As Mr. Justioe Black says. The
history of man is Insepareble from the history of reli
gion." There's nothing unconstitutional in teaching
about religion. Indeed, every public-school teacher
should make it plain to children that the school's lack
of religious activities is not because it disbelieves in
religion or feels it unimportant, but because of the
belief of the Fotinding Fathers- -most of them devout men�
I5011ver Q. Wilson, "America's Public Schools," ^toe
Wesleyan Methodist, 120:2, September 19, 19o2.
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that government refusal to participate in religion furthers our basic freedom to believe or not believe as we
like
The obvious objection to this idea, however, la that in merely
teaching about religion, there is no expression of any per
sonal committment or dependence upon the God of religious
doctrine. To fulfill this need, some have suggested periods
of silent meditation as a possible alternative to vocalized
prayer.
Su^ested Periods of Silent Meditation
Probably one of the very fine cmaproraises in the en
tire problem is that of silent meditation as a morning devo
tional, rather than prayer, for no one really can object to
this- It is the system used by the l&ilted Nations in opening
the first plenary meeting of each session, and even the C^-
munists do not object to it. During this time the religious
person can pray, and the Irreligious can dedicate himself to
certain ideals irtilch he considers to be highest. �'�7 There
are those, however, who feel "that even this might be adjudged
a violation of the Constitution if any govenraental body pre
scribed such a religious program as an official part of the
^^llllam J. Butler, "Has the Supreme Court Outlawed
Hellglous Observance in the Schools?" Reader's Digest, 81i7o-
85, October, 1962.
17i<iitorlal in Ihe New York Times, July 1, 1962,
Sec. IV. p. 8.
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school's discipline."!� The possibility of this is seen in
the fact that when many of the New York school boards began
to use the third and fourth stanzas of "The Star Spangled
Banner" as a morning prayer, the State's Commissioner of
Education, Dr. James �. Allen, ruled that this also violates
the Supreme Court ruling because the lines from the National
Anthem had been adopted as an "official prayer. "19 It ap
pears quite evident, therefore, that practically every attempt
to overcome the problems Involved in the decision of the
prayer case Is met with heavy opposition. Itor are these sug
gestions the only ones put forward, though they are, pexiiaps,
the most frequently suggested ideas for getting around the
problems involved. In view of the wide-spread disagreement
concerning tills case and ways of overcoming its resultant
problems, it might be fair to say that no conclusions can be
drawn concerning its ultimate Church-State relations. How
ever, there are certain observations which may be legiti
mately made, and it is to these that the discussion must now
turn.
iSpavld Lawx�ftce, "is Prayer in Schools Heally Barred?"
0. S. Mews, 535100, ^^^7 9, 1962.
-'�9"prayer Issue Still Boiling," Sunday; School nmes,
104 12, September 22, 1962.
III. GEHERAL OBSERVATIONS
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Tha dlaoussion of this section of this study will be
divided Into two unequal sections. The first will deal with
the researcher's observations concerning Church-State rela
tions and Che second and concluding section of the paper will
be devoted to merely pointing out some areas where further
study might be profitable.
Church-State Relations
Two things of great Importance come out strengly as a
direct resvilt of the ease Just studied: (l) it is definitely
considered to be unconstitutional for the goverment to write
preyere, or to prescribe forms or rituals for worshlpi and
(2) It Is unquestionably not unconstitutional for devotional
periods to be conducted when all concerned are desirous of them.
This may legitimately be said in spite of the conten
tions of the esteemed Justice Douglas, for, in the feelings
of this researcher, his position lacks substantiation and
must be considered to be invalid. Also, because of the fact
that virtually no one, in the couree of this atudy, was
found who was in agreement with the Concurring Opinion, this
researeher feels that the position, though the opinion of an
expert. Is not the threat (at least for the present) which
many fear. It must not, however, be lightly dismissed,
either,
for it could be used in future caces as an argument by the
Ill
forces of irrellglon. Should this occur, its fallacies
should be brought out. Until such a time, however, it need
not be feared.
Continuing therefore, it must be said that If it is
unconstitutional for a state government to prescribe a set
pattern of worship, it must likewise be forbidden for it to
fort) id any form of ptiblic worship. If, for Instance, a class
of Califomians decided they desired to begin eachdday with
a passage trovt the Bible
�which practice Is not permitted in
that state�they ought not to be foi^jldden that privilege.
�ius, though It must not be denied that "goverxmient in this
country, be it state or federal, is without power
to prescribe
by law any particular form of prayer which is to
be used as
an official prayer in carrying on any program of govemmentally
sponsored activity;" (B. 8) this must not be permitted
to
become a question of whether or not "school children
who
want to begin their day by joining in prayer must
be prohi
bited from doing so." (S. 2)
The qaiemtXon of Churoh-State relations ia
a delicate
one, but it must never be forgotten that
the real question Is
not "Shall there be relations between the
Church and the
State?" but rather, "What shall be the nature
of these rela
tions between Church and State?" When the first question
begins to take precedence, as it has
in the minds of some.
the impossible situation.besins to arise in which
the attempt
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l8 made to split mankind against himself by putting the two
greatest gOTexnlng powers�spiritual and temporal�against one
another trtille pretending that they actually have no relation.
To divorce religion ccMapletely from government Is to commit
oneself to a type of cultural schizophrenia from which only
the most drastic changes can rescue one. The second question
above, however, is a basic consideration whloh must be dis
cussed intelligently in order for the oulture to remain healthy.
In the ccKBparatlvely monolithic society of the Middle Ages
this question was continually coming up�how much more dif
ficult to answer is it in modem, plxiraiistlc American soc
iety. "Pertuips," an editorial in The Hew York Times points
out, "the only way to deal with these subtle and abrasive pro-
hlems is by looking at the particular facts of each case as it
comes along.
"^� The xmfortunate thing about this, however,
is that to the modem mind, such an approach is unscientific,
for the particular trend of decisions in this field is likely
to switch from Court to Court, as old members leave it in
death and new members are appointed to it. The history of
such decisions is already likened to a "Serpentine Wall"^^
and it will undoubtedly continue to wind its way along through
the future until something definitive is done.
^Opte New York Times, Jvme 28, 19^2, p. 17.
2! "Church-State Separation: A Serpentine Wall?"
Christianity Today, 6:25-31/ 3\LLy 20, 19o2.
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It is, th�refo3pe, the considered opinion of this re-
aeai^her, that what is needed in this situation, la not sug
gestions as to how to "get aroimd" the problems Involved in
this oase� such as Constitutional Amendments, parochial
schools, or atten^ta at compromise like periods of silent
prayer -but a thorough study on the part of all concerned in
both govenwaent and religious circles and a riutiially aatls-
fa'T'tory statement of what the nature of the ralatlonshipa be
tween the Church and the State shall be- Thera needs to be
gome recognition made of minority opinions and digsent?ng
groups for they must not t-a autjectito any form of coercion- -
nor, however, can the rights of the majority be sacrificed
to mere defensive whims of the minority under any circumstances.
Church-State Separation has traditionally meant Church-
State Cooperation, and this has worked well, as indicated in
the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Stewart, but it Is also
true that "the Church must not draw up laws for the State,
and the State must not prescribe forms of devotion for the
Church. "2^ Along this line, is the very relevant observation
of Mr. 84. L. Rieketts in the Christian Advocate:
Virtually all Christians are agreed that Clirlstians
ought to try to apply Christian teachings to the social
problems of tie day, at least privately. Nor can uhere be
any question of the minister's right to speak to fti� .
own people on their practices and attitudes with regard
25"The Supreme Court and P^-ayer," gic .Christian
Advocate, 6:ll-ia, August 16, 19o2
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to race relations, use of Intoxicants, or observance of
Sunday. But whether or not the churches have a rightto say anything to the leaders of govemaient and to tryto Influence legislation Is another matter. Here we
go beyond purely ecclesiastical discipline Into church-
state relations .23
It might, at this point be logically asked, "If the (a�urch
has not the right to enter Into questions of Church-State
relations, who has?" The major thrust of the article, how
ever. Is good, Indsplte of this one question, for basically
what he Is saying Is that the Church should stay out of the
mess of playing "power politics" and this is absolutely
correct. It cannot, however, be asked to sit idly by if
gross social injustices are done to it by the state�such an
injustice would be Involved in any attempts by the state to
establish secularism as an official state philosophy. This
might be done either by legislation or by litigation, and the
Church has the indisputable right to make its needs known
in this as in any situation with grave social implications.
It ought not, however, bring force to bear upon legislators
In an endeavor to Ixifluence their voting.
In conclusion, therefore, let the following observations
stand as the final thoughts of this study: The decision of
the Ifelted States Supreme Court in the Engel v. Vitale case
made it patently unconstitutional for any state or federal
23ll. L. Ricketts, "The Church and Political Action,"
Christian Advocate. 6:10, September 27, 1962.
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agency to prescribe any prayer or ritual to be used as an
official devotional pattern. On the other hand, no attempt
was made to remove all religion from the schools, for vol
untary expressions of devotion in classes desiring them are
not banned�not only is this so, but it must likewise be true
that legislation forbidding such voluntary devotional periods
must be considered unconstitutional. Between these two
extremes stand a vast number of cherished practices heretofore
deemed acceptable, but now called into question by this new
Interpretation of the First Amendment to the Constitution.
Nothing more can definitely be stated concerning these Important
practices, however, than that they are left in doubt and
their constitutionality can not be detemined until they are
brought before the Supreme Court for individual adjudication.
Some such cases already on the docket promise to give more
light to the situation than can presently be indicated by
the Bngel case, but it may be assured that the forces of ir
rellglon will use whatever precedents they can to remove re
ligion from public life in the United States, and it is not
to be denied that a dangerous element of such a precedent
exists in the decision of this case�dangerous, though not
yet conclusive. Though it would not be ethical for the
Church
to play "power politics" and attempt to Influence litigation
in its own favor, there is certainly nothing to be said against
the Church making known its views for the consideration of
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futar* cases. XJltlBately, then, it is possible that the only
real conclusion one can presently come to is this:
Whatever else it may mean, the Supreme Oourt decision
in the Mew York school prayer case has made it patently
clear that the relationship between religion and public ^
life in the Qfiited States needs a thorough re-examination.'^
Suggestions for Fxtrther Study
As stated earlier in this thesis, one very pertinent
area needing further study is the relationship of this case
to other, similar eases- -particularly those referred to in
the doouments of this case, such as Zoraoh v. Clausen,
McOowan v. Maryland, McCollum v. Board of Bduoation, and
Bverson v. Beard of Bdueation. Comparisons might be drawn
to see why certain things were viewed as constitutional and
why certain other things were not so viewed. This could
be
carried as far back into history as possible, for the entire
tradition ef the relationship between Church and State eould
be in question by the precedents set by this deeUion.
Another area of study which should be fruitful, would
be a
study of the voting histories of those Justices participating
in this decision, who have participated in other similar de
cisions. There is evidence that some of them-Justice
Douglas
la particular�may have made rather remarkable changes
in
their ways of thinking. It would be interesting
to study to
24�ihe Oourt on Prayer," Commonweal, 76:387-88, July
13, 1962.
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discover what manner of change, if any, has been made in the
thinking of any of the Justices, and why the changes may have
taken place. Of great Importanoe would be the study of the
cases presently upon the docket of the Supreme Oourt and care
ful analyses of them and o<MBparlson of them with this oase.
Finally, before this case or any succeeding cases will be of
any real conclusive value, there must be a thorough study
made into the relations between Qiurch and State and some
definitive conclusions drawn. This, of course, will take
many studies and many workers, but until it is done, the Judg
ments of the Supreme Court and the legislations of the federal
and state legislatures will continue to wind along in their
serpentine way, clashing in indecisive litigation whenever
they are thrown together by petitioning agencies. There must
be a better way than this, and any study which will aid in
finding that better way will be of immense value
in the
problem of straightening out the Serpentine Wall.
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"Constitution of tae United States, " Collier's aicyclopedla,
(1956 ed.), V, 626-632.
SUPREME COUET OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 468.�October Term, 1961.
Steven I. Engel et al.,
Petitioners,
V.
William J. Vitale, Jr., et al.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Court of Appeals of New
York.
[June 25, 1962.]
Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent Board of Education of Union Free
School District No. 9, New Hyde Park, New York, acting
in its official capacity under state law, directed the School
District's principal to cause the following prayer to be
said aloud by each class in the presence of a teacher at
the beginning of each school day;
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence
upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our
parents, our teachers and our country."
This daily procedure was adopted on the recommenda
tion of the State Board of Regents, a governmental agency
created by the State Constitution to which the New York
Legislature has granted broad supervisory, executive, and
legislative powers over the State's public school system.'
These state officials composed the prayer which they
recommended and published as a part of their "State
ment on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools,"
saying: "We believe that this Statement will be sub
scribed to by all men and women of good will, and we call
upon all of them to aid in giving life to our program."
iSee New York Constitution, Art. V, �4; New York Education
Law, �� 101, 120 et seq., 202, 214-219, 224, 245 et m-, 704,
and
801 et seq.
2 ENGEL V. VITALE.
Shortly after the practice of reciting the Regents'
prayer was adopted by the School District, the parents of
ten pupils brought this action in a New York State Court
insisting that use of this official prayer in the public
schools was contrary to the beliefs, religions, or religious
practices of both themselves and their children. Among
other things, these parents challenged the constitution
ality of both the state law authorizing the School District
to direct the use of prayer in public schools and the School
District's regulation ordering the recitation of this par
ticular prayer on the ground that these actions of official
governmental agencies violate that part of the First
Amendment of the Federal Constitution which commands
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish
ment of religion"�a command which was "made appli
cable to the State of New York by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the said Constitution." The New York
Court of Appeals, over the dissents of Judges Dye and
Fuld, sustained an order of the lower state courts which
had upheld the power of New York to use the Regents'
prayer as a part of the daily procedures of its public
schools so long as the schools did not compel any pupil
to join in the prayer over his or his parents' objection.'
We granted certiorari to review this important decision
2 10 N. Y. 2d 174, 176 N. E. 2d 579. The trial court's opinion,
which is reported at 18 Misc. 2d 659, 191 N. Y. S. 2d 453, had
made it clear that the Board of Education must set up some sort
of procedures to protect those who objected to reciting the prayer:
"This is not to say that the rights accorded petitioners and their
children under the 'free exercise' clause do not mandate safeguards
against such embarrassments and pressures. It is enough on this
score, however, that regulations, such as were adopted by New
York City's Board of Education in connection with its released time
program, be adopted, making clear that neither teachers nor any
other school authority may comment on participation or nonpartici-
pation in the exercise nor suggest or require that any posture or
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involving rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.'
We think that by using its public school system to
encourage recitation of the Regents' prayer, the State
of New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent
with the Establishment Clause. There can, of course,
be no doubt that New York's program of daily classroom
invocation of God's blessings as prescribed in the Regents'
prayer is a religious activity. It is a solemn avowal of
divine faith and supplication for the blessings of the
Almighty. The nature of such a prayer has always been
religious, none of the respondents has denied this and
the trial court expressly so found:
"The religious nature of prayer was recognized by
Jefferson and has been concurred in by theological
writers, the United States Supreme Court and State
courts and administrative officials, including New
York's Commissioner of Education. A committee of
the New York Legislature has agreed.
"The Board of Regents as amicus curiae, the
respondents and interveners all concede the religious
language be used or dress be worn or be not used or not worn. Non-
participation may take the form either of remaining silent during
the exercise, or if the parent or child so desires, of being excused
entirely from the exercise. Such regulations must also make provi
sion for those nonparticipants who are to be excused from the prayer
exercise. The exact provision to be made is a matter for decision by
the board, rather than the court, within the framework of constitu
tional requirements. Within that framework would fall a provision
that prayer participants proceed to a common assembly while non-
participants attend other rooms, or that nonparticipants be permitted
to arrive at school a few minutes late or to attend separate opening
exercises, or any other method which treats with equality both par
ticipants and nonparticipants." 18 Misc. 2d, at 696, 191 N. Y. S, 2d,
at 492-493. See also the opinion of the Appellate Division affirming
that of the trial court, reported at 11 App. Div. 2d 340, 206 N. Y. S.
2d 183.
^ 368 U. S. 924.
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nature of prayer, but seek to distinguish this prayer
because it is based on our spiritual heritage. . . ." *
The petitioners contend among other things that the
state laws requiring or permitting use of the Regents'
prayer must be struck down as a violation of the Estab
lishment Clause because that prayer was compoded by
governmental officials as a part of a governmental pro
gram to further religious beliefs. For this reason, peti
tioners argue, the State's use of the Regents' prayer in its
public school system breaches the constitutional wall of
separation between Church and State. We agree with
that contention since we think that the constitutional pro
hibition against laws respecting an establishment of
religion must at least mean that in this country- it is
no part of the business of government to compose
official prayers for any group of the American people to
recite as a part of a religious program carried on by
government.
It is a matter of history that this very practice of estab
lishing governmentally composed prayers for religious
services was one of the reasons which caused many
of our early colonists to leave England and seek religious
freedom in America. The Book of Common Prayer,
which was created under governmental direction and
which was approved by Acts of Parliament in 1548 and
1549,= set out in minute detail the accepted form and
content of prayer and other religious ceremonies to be
used in the established, tax-supported Church of Eng-
land.� The controversies over the Book and what should
< 18 Misc. 2d, at 671-672, 191 N. Y. S. 2d, at 468-469.
= 2 & 3 Edward VI, c. 1, entitled "An Act for Uniformity of Service
and Administration of the Sacraments throughout the Realm" ; 3 & 4
Edward VI, c. 10, entitled "An Act for the abolishing and putting
away of divers Books and Images."
The provisions of the various versions of the Book of Common
Prayer are set out in broad outhne in the Encyclopedia Britannica,
Vol. 18 (1957 ed.), pp. 420-423. For a more complete description^
see PuUan, The History of the Book of Common Prayer (1900)
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be its content repeatedly threatened to disrupt the peace
of that country as the accepted forms of prayer in the
established church changed with the views of the par
ticular ruler that happened to be in control at the time.'
Powerful groups representing some of the varying reli
gious views of the people struggled among themselves to
impress their particular views upon the Government and
obtain amendments of the Book more suitable to their
respective notions of how religious services should be con
ducted in order that the official religious establishment
would advance their particular religious beliefs." Other
' The first major revision of the Book of Common Prayer was
made in 1552 during the reign of Edward VI. 5 & 6 Edward VI, c. 1.
In 1553, Edward VI died and was succeeded by Mary who abolished
the Book of Common Prayer entirely. 1 Mary, c. 2. But upon the
accession of Ehzabeth in 1558, the Book was restored with important
alterations from the form it had been given by Edward VI. 1 Eliza
beth, c. 2. The resentment to this amended form of the Book was
kept firmly under control during the reign of Elizabeth but, upon her
death in 1603, a petition signed by more than 1,000 Puritan ministers
was presented to King James I asking for further alterations in the
Book. Some alterations were made and the Book retained substan
tially this form until it was completely suppressed again in 1645 as a
result of the successful Puritan Revolution. Shortly after the restora
tion in 1660 of Charles II, the Book was again reintroduced, 13 & 14
Charles II, c. 4, and again with alterations. Rather than accept this
form of the Book some 2,000 Puritan ministers vacated their benefices.
See generally Pullan, The History of the Book of Common Prayer
(1900), pp. vii-xvi; Encyclopedia Britannica (1957 ed.),
\oI. 18,
pp. 421-422. , T, , f
8 For example, the Puritans twice attempted to modify
the Book ot
Common Prayer and once attempted to destroy it. The story
of
their struggle to modify the Book in the reign of Charles
I is vividly
summarized in Pullan, History of the Book of Common Prayer,
at
p xiii- "The King actively supported those members
of the Church
of England who were anxious to vindicate its Catholic
character and
maintain the ceremomal which Elizabeth h^d/pproved. Laud
Archbishop of Canterbury, was the leader
of this school. Equally
resolute in his opposition to the distinctive ^'^^'^ f^"'^
Geneva, he enjoyed the hatred of both Jesuit
and Calvimst H
helped he Sco tish bishops, who had
made large concessions to the
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groups, lacking the necessary political power to influence
the Government on the matter, decided to leave England
and its established church and seek freedom in America
from England's governmentally ordained and supported
religion.
It is an unfortunate fact of history that when some of
the very groups which had most strenuously opposed the
established Church of England found themselves suffi
ciently in control of colonial governments in this country
to write their own prayers into law, they passed laws mak
ing their own religion the official religion of their respec
tive colonies.' Indeed, as late as the time of the Revolu
tionary War, there were established churches in at least
eight of the thirteen former colonies and established reli
gions in at least four of the other five." But the success-
uncouth habits of Presbyterian worship, to draw up a Book of Com
mon Prayer for Scotland. It contained a Communion Office resem
bling that of the book of 1549. It came into use in 1637, and met
with a bitter and barbarous opposition. The vigour of the Scottish
Protestants strengthened the hands of their English sympathisers.
Laud and Charles were executed, Episcopacy was abohshed, the use
of the Book of Common Prayer was prohibited."
" For a description of some of the laws enacted by early theocratic
governments in New England, see Parrington, Main Currents in
American Thought (1930), Vol. 1, pp. 5-50; Whipple, Our Ancient
Liberties (1927), pp. 63-78; Wertenbaker, The Puritan Oligarchy
(1947).
"The Church of England was the established church of at least
five colonies: Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina
and Georgia. There seems to be some controversy as to whether that
church was officially established in New York and New Jersey but
there is no doubt that it received substantial support from those
states. See Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America (1902),
pp. 338, 408. In Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Connecticut,
the Congregationalist Church was officially established. In Pennsyl
vania and Delaware, all Christian sects were treated equally in most
situations but Catholics were discriminated against in some respects.
See generally Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America (1902) ,
In Rhode Island all Protestants enjoyed equal privileges but it is not
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ful Revolution against English political domination was
shortly followed by intense opposition to the practice of
establishing rehgion by law. This opposition crystalhzed
rapidly into an effective political force in Virginia where
the minority religious groups such as Presbyterians, Lu
therans, Quakers and Baptists had gained such strength
that the adherents to the established Episcopal Church
were actually a minority themselves. In 1785-1786,
those opposed to the established Church, led by James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, who, though themselves
not members of any of these dissenting religious groups,
opposed all religious establishments by law on grounds of
principle, obtained the enactment of the famous "Vir
ginia Bill for Religious Liberty" by which all religious
groups were placed on an equal footing so far as the State
was concerned. Similar though less far-reaching legis
lation was being considered and passed in other States.
By the time of the adoption of the Constitution, our
history shows that there was a widespread awareness
among many Americans of the dangers of a union of
Church and State. These people knew, some of them
from bitter personal experience, that one of the greatest
clear whether Catholics were allowed to vote. Compare Fiske, The
Critical Period in American History (1899), p. 76 with Cobb, The
Rise of Religious Liberty in America (1902), pp. 437-438.
" 12 Hening, Statutes of Virginia (1823), 84, entitled "An Act for
establishing religious freedom.'' The story of the events surrounding
the enactment of this law was reviewed in Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U. S. 1, both by the Court, at pp. 11-13, and in the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge, at pp. 33-42. See also
Fiske, The Critical Period in American History (1899), pp. 78-82;
James, The Struggle for Religious Liberty in Virginia (1900) ; Thom,
The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Virginia: The Baptists
(1900) ; Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America (1902), pp.
74-115, 482-499.
"See Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America (1902),
pp. 482-509.
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dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in
his own way lay in the Government's placing its oflBcial
stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer
or one particular form of religious services. They knew
the anguish, hardship and bitter strife that could come
when zealous religious groups struggled with one another
to obtain the Government's stamp of approval from each
King, Queen, or Protector that came to temporary power.
The Constitution was intended to avert a part of this
danger by leaving the government of this country in the
hands of the people rather than in the hands of any
monarch. But this safeguard was not enough. Our
Founders were no more willing to let the content of their
prayers and their privilege of praying whenever they
pleased be influenced by the ballot box than they were to
let these vital matters of personal conscience depend
upon the succession of monarchs. The First Amend
ment was added to the Constitution to stand as a guaran
tee that neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal
Government would be used to control, support or influ
ence the kinds of prayer the American people can say�
that the people's religions must not be subjected to the
pressures of government for change each time a new
political administration is elected to office. Under that
Amendment's prohibition against governmental establish
ment of religion, as reinforced by the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, government in this country, be
it state or federal, is without power to prescribe by law
any particular form of prayer which is to be used as an
official prayer in carrying on any program of govern-
mentally sponsored religious activity.
There can be no doubt that New York's state prayer
program officially establishes the religious beliefs em
bodied in the Regents' prayer. The respondents' argu
ment to the contrary, which is largely based upon the
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contention that the Regents' prayer is "non-denomina
tional" and the fact that the program, as modified and
approved by state courts, does not require all pupils to
recite the prayer but permits those who wish to do so
to remain silent or be excused from the room, ignores the
essential nature of the program's constitutional defects.
Neither the fact that the prayer may be denomina
tionally neutral, nor the fact that its observance on the
part of the students is voluntary can serve to free it from
the limitations of the Establishment Clause, as it might
from the Free Exercise Clause, of the First Amendment,
both of which are operative against the States by virtue
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although these two
clauses may in certain instances overlap, they forbid two
quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon
religious freedom. The Establishment Clause, unlike the
Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing
of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the
enactment of laws which establish an official religion
whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserv-
ing individuals or not. This is not to say, of course, that
laws officially prescribing a particular form of religious
worship do not involve coercion of such individuals.
When the power, prestige and financial support of govern
ment is placed behind a particular religious belief, the
indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to con
form to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.
But the purposes underlying the EstabHshment Clause
go much further than that. Its first and most imme
diate purpose rested on the belief that a union of govern
ment and religion tends to destroy government and to
degrade religion. The history of governmentally estab
lished religion, both in England and in this country,
showed that whenever government had allied itself with
one particular form of religion, the inevitable result had
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been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even
contempt of those who held contrary beliefs." That same
history showed that many people had lost their respect
for any religion that had relied upon the support of gov
ernment to spread its faith.^* The Establishment Clause
thus stands as an expression of principle on the part of the
Founders of our Constitution that religion is too personal,
too sacred, too holy, to permit its "unhallowed perversion"
by a civil magistrate." Another purpose of the Estab
lishment Clause rested upon an awareness of the historical
fact that governmentally established religions and reli
gious persecutions go hand in hand.'" The Founders
"[A]ttempts to enforce by legal sanctions, acts obnoxious to so
great a proportion of Citizens, tend to enervate the laws in general,
and to slacken the bands of Society. If it be difficult to execute any
law which is not generally deemed necessary or salutary, what must
be the case where it is deemed invalid and dangerous? and what
may be the effect of so striking an example of impotency in the Gov
ernment, on its general authority." Memorial and Remonstrance
against Religious Assessments, II Writings of Madison 183, 190.
1* "It is moreover to weaken in those who profess this Religion a
pious confidence in its innate excellence, and the patronage of its
Author; and to foster in those who still reject it, a suspicion that
its friends are too conscious of its fallacies, to trust it to its own
merits. . , . [Ejxperience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establish
ments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have
had a contrary operation. During almost fifteen centuries, has the
legal establishment of Christianity been on trial. What have been
its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and indolence in the
Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity; in both, superstition,
bigotry and persecution. Enquire of the Teachers of Christianity for
the ages in which it appeared in its greatest lustre; those of every
sect, point to the ages prior to its incorporation with Civil policy."
Id., at 187.
" Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, II
Writings of Madison, at 187.
"[T]he proposed estabhshment is a departure from that generous
policy, which, offering an asylum to the persecuted and oppressed of
every Nation and Rehgion, promised a lustre to our country, and
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knew that only a few years after the Book of Common
Prayer became the only accepted form of religious serv
ices in the established Church of England, an Act of Uni
formity was passed to compel all Englishmen to attend
those services and to make it a criminal offense to conduct
or attend religious gatherings of any other kind "�a law
which was consistently flouted by dissenting religious
groups in England and which contributed to widespread
an accession to the number of its citizens. What a melancholy mark
is the Bill of sudden degeneracy? Instead of holding forth an asylum
to the persecuted, it is itself a signal of persecution. . . . Distant
as it may be, in its present form, from the Inquisition it differs from
it only in degree. The one is the first step, the other the last in the
career of intolerance. The magnanimous sufferer under this cruel
scourge in foreign Regions, must view the Bill as a Beacon on our
Coast, warning him to seek some other haven, where libertj- and
philanthropy in their due extent may offer a more certain repose from
his troubles.'' Id., at 188.
1' 5 & 6 Edward VI, c. 1, entitled "An Act for the Uniformity
of Service and Administration of Sacraments throughout the Realm."
This Act was repealed during the reign of Mary but revived upon the
accession of Elizabeth. See note 7, supra. The reasons which led
to the enactment of this statute were set out in its preamble: "Where
there hath been a very godly Order set forth by the Authority of
Parliament, for Common Prayer and Administration of Sacraments
to be used in the Mother Tongue within the Church of England,
agreeable to the Word of God and the Primitive Church, very com
fortable to all good People desiring to live in Christian Conversation,
and most profitable to the Estate of this Realm, upon the which the
Mercy, Favour and Blessing of Almighty God is in no wise so readily
and plenteously poured as by Common Prayers, due using of the
Sacraments, and often preaching of the Gospel, with the Devotion
of the Hearers: (1) And yet this notwithstanding, a great Number of
People in divers Parts of this Realm, following their own Sensuality,
and living either without Knowledge or due Fear of God, do wilfully
and damnably before Almighty God abstain and refuse to come to
their Parish Churches and other Places where Common Prayer,
Administration of the Sacraments, and Preaching of the Word of
God, is used upon Sundays and other Days ordained to be Holydays."
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persecutions of people like John Bunyan who persisted in
holding "unlawful [religious] meetings ... to the great
disturbance and distraction of the good subjects of this
kingdom. . . ." " And they knew that similar persecu
tions had received the sanction of law in several of the
colonies in this country soon after the establishment of
official religions in those colonies." It was in large part
to get completely away from this sort of systematic reh-
gious persecution that the Founders brought into being
our Nation, our Constitution, and our Bill of Rights with
its prohibition against any governmental establishment
of religion. The New York laws officially prescribing the
Regents' prayer are inconsistent with both the purposes
of the Establishment Clause and with the Establishment
Clause itself.
It has been argued that to apply the Constitution in
such a way as to prohibit state laws respecting an
establishment of religious services in public schools is
to indicate a hostility toward religion or toward prayer.
Nothing, of course, could be more wrong. The history
of man is inseparable from the history of religion. And
perhaps it is not too much to say that since the beginning
of that history many people have devoutly believed that
"More things are wrought by prayer than thi� world
dreams of." It was doubtless largely due to men who
believed this that there grew up a sentiment that caused
men to leave the cross-currents of officially established
state religions and religious persecution in Europe and
come to this country filled with the hope that they
could find a place in which they could pray when they
IS Bunyan's own account of his trial is set forth in A Relation of
the Imprisonment of Mr. John Bunyan, reprinted in Grace Abound
ing and The Pilgrim's Progress (Brown ed. 1907), at 103-132.
" For a vivid account of some of these persecutions, see Werten
baker, The Puritan Oligarchy (1947).
ENGEL V. VITALE. 13
pleased to the God of their faith in the language they
chose.'"' And there were men of this same faith in the
power of prayer who led the fight for adoption of our
Constitution and also for our Bill of Rights with the
very guarantees of religious freedom that forbid the sort
of governmental activity which New York has attempted
here. These men knew that the First Amendment, which
tried to put an end to governmental control of religion and
Perhaps the best example of the sort of men who came to this
country for precisely that reason is Roger Williams, the founder of
Rhode Island, who has been described as "the truest Christian
amongst many who sincerely desired to be Christian." Parrington,
Main Currents of American Thought (1930), Vol. 1, at p. 74. Wil
liams, who was one of the earliest exponents of the doctrine of sepa
ration of church and state, believed that separation was necessary in
order to protect the church from the danger of destruction which he
thought inevitably flowed from control by even the best-intentioned
civil authorities: "The unknowing zeale of Constantine and other
Emperours, did more hurt to Christ Jesus his Crowne and Kingdome,
then the raging fury of the most bloody Neroes. In the persecutions
of the later. Christians were sweet and fragrant, like spice pounded
and beaten in morters: But those good Emperours, persecuting some
erroneous persons, Arrius, &c. and advancing the professours of some
Truths of Christ (for there was no small number of Truths lost in
those times) and maintaining their Religion by the materiall Sword,
I say by this meanes Christianity was ecclipsed, and the Professors of
it fell asleep . . . ." Williams, The Bloudy Tenent, of Persecution,
for cause of Conscience, discussed, in A Conference betweene Truth
and Peace (London, 1644), reprinted in Naragansett Club Publica
tions, Vol. Ill, p. 184. To Williams, it was no part of the business
or competence of a civil magistrate to interfere in religious matters:
"[W]hat imprudence and indiscretion is it in the most common
affaires of Life, to conceive that Emperours, Kings and Rulers of the
earth must not only be qualified with politicall and state abilities to
make and execute such Civill Lawes which may concerne the com
mon rights, peace and safety (which is worke and businesse, load and
burthen enough for the ablest shoulders in the Commonweal) but
also furnished with such Spirituall and heavenh- abilities to governe
the Spirituall and Christian Commonweale. .
" Id., at 366. See
also id., at 136-137.
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of prayer, was not written to destroy either. They knew
rather that it was written to quiet well-justified fears
which nearly all of them felt arising out of an awareness
that governments of the past had shackled men's tongues
to make them speak only the religious thoughts that gov
ernment wanted them to speak and to pray only to the
God that government wanted them to pray to. It is
neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each
separate government in this country should stay out of
the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers
and leave that purely religious function to the people
themselves and to those the people choose to look to for
religious guidance."
It is true that New York's establishment of its Regents'
prayer as an officially approved religious doctrine of that
State does not amount to a total establishment of one
particular religious sect to the exclusion of all others�
that, indeed, the governmental endorsement of that
prayer seems relatively insignificant when compared to
the governmental encroachments upon religion which
were commonplace 200 years ago. To those who may
subscribe to the view that because the Regents' official
prayer is so brief and general there can be no danger to
religious freedom in its governmental establishment, how
ever, it may be appropriate to say in the words of James
Madison, the author of the First Amendment:
" There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is
inconsistent with the fact that school children and others are officially
encouraged to express love for our country by reciting historical
documents such as the Declaration of Independence which contain
references to the Deity or by singing officially espoused anthems which
include the composer's professions of faith in a Supreme Being, or
with the fact that there are many manifestations in our public life
of belief in God. Such patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no true
resemblance to the unquestioned rehgious exercise that the State of
New York has sponsored in this instance.
ENGEL V. VITALE. 15
"[I]t is proper to take alarm at the first experiment
on our liberties. . . . Who does not see that the
same authority which can establish Christianity, in
exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with
the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in
exclusion of all other Sects? That the same author
ity which can force a citizen to contribute three pence
only of his property for the support of any one
establishment, may force him to conform to any other
establishment in all cases whatsoever?"
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York
is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceed
ings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the decision
of this case.
Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case.
" Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments,
Writings of Madison 183, at 185-186.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 468.�October Term, 1961.
Steven I. Engel et al.,
Petitioners,
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Court of Appeals of New
York.
William J. Vitale, Jr., et al.
[June 25, 1962.]
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring.
It is customary in deciding a constitutional question to
treat it in its narrowest form. Yet at times the setting of
the question gives it a form and content which no abstract
treatment could do. The point for decision is whether
the Government can constitutionally finance a religious
exercise. Our system at the federal and state levels is
presently honeycombed with such financing.' Neverthe-
1 "There are many 'aids' to rehgion in this country at all levels of
government. To mention but a few at the federal level, one might
begin by observing that the very First Congress which wrote the
First Amendment provided for chaplains in both Houses and in the
armed services. There is compulsory chapel at the service academies,
and religious services are held in federal hospitals and prisons.
The
President issues religious proclamations. The Bible is used for the
administration of oaths. N. Y. A. and W. P. A. funds were
available
to parochial schools during the depression. Veterans receiving money
under the 'G I ' Bill of 1944 could attend denominational schools,
to which payments were made directly by the government. During
World War II, federal money was contributed to denominationa^
schools for the training of nurses. The benefits of
the National
School Lunch Act are available to students in private
as well as
pubhc schools. The Hospital Survey and Construction
Act of 1946
specifically made money available to non-pubhc hospitals.
The slogan
'In God We Trust' is used by the Treasury Department,
and Con
gress recently added God to the pledge
of aUeg.ance. There is
l b -reading in the schools of the District of Columbia, and rehgiousfnluction I given in the District's National� Scho^^^^^^^^
Boys. Religious organizations are exempt
from the federal income
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less, I think it is an unconstitutional undertakingwhatever
form it takes.
First, a word as to what this case does not involve.
Plainly, our Bill of Rights would not permit a State
or the Federal Government to adopt an official prayer and
penalize anyone who would not utter it. This, however,
is not that case, for there is no element of compulsion or
coercion in New York's regulation requiring that public
schools be opened each day with the following prayer :
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence
upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our
parents, our teachers and our Country."
The prayer is said upon the commencement of the
school day, immediately following the pledge of allegiance
to the flag. The prayer is said aloud in the presence of
a teacher, who either leads the recitation or selects a
student to do so. No student, however, is compelled to
take part. The respondents have adopted a regulation
which provides that "neither teachers nor any school
authority shall comment on participation or non-partici
pation . . . nor suggest or request that any posture or
language be used or dress be worn or be not used or not
worn." Provision is also made for excusing children,
upon written request of a parent or guardian, from the
saying of the prayer or from the room in which the prayer
is said. A letter implementing and explaining this regu
lation has been sent to each taxpayer and parent in the
school district. As I read this regulation, a child is free
to stand or not stand, to recite or not recite, without fear
tax and are granted postal privileges. Up to defined limits�15 per
cent of the adjusted gross income of individuals and 5 per cent of
the net income of corporations�contributions to religious organiza
tions are deductible for federal income tax purposes. There are limits
to the deductibility of gifts and bequests to religious institutions made
under the federal gift and estate tax laws. This list of federal 'aids'
could easily be expanded, and of course there is a long list in each
state." Fellman, The Limits of Freedom (1959), pp. 40-41.
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of reprisal or even comment by the teacher or any other
school official.
In short, the only one who need utter the prayer is the
teacher; and no teacher is complaining of it. Students
can stand mute or even leave the classroom, if they desire.'
McCollum V. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, does
not decide this case. It involved the use of public school
facilities for religious education of students. Students
either had to attend religious instruction or "go to some
other place in the school building for pursuit of their
secular studies. . . . Reports of their presence or absence
were to be made to their secular teachers." Id., at 209.
The influence of the teaching staff was therefore brought
to bear on the student body, to support the instilling reli
gious principles. In the present case, school facilities are
used to say the prayer and the teaching staff is employed
to lead the pupils in it. There is, however, no effort at
indoctrination and no attempt at exposition. Prayers of
course may be so long and of such a character as to
amount to an attempt at the religious instruction that was
denied the public schools by the McCollum case. But
New York's prayer is of a character that does not involve
any element of proselytizing as in the McCollum case.
The question presented by this case is therefore an
extremely narrow one. It is whether New York oversteps
the bounds when it finances a religious exercise.
What New York does on the opening of its public
schools is what we do when we open court. Our Marshal
has from the beginning announced the convening of the
Court and then added "God save the United States and
2 West Point Cadets are required to attend chapel each Sunday.
Reg 0 21 �2101. The same requirement obtains
at the Naval
Academy (Reg., c. 9, � 0901, (1) (a)), and at the Air
Force Academy
except First Classmen. Catalogue, 1962-1963, p.
110. And see
Honeywell, Chaplains of the United States Army (1958) ; Jorgensen
The Service of Chaplains to Army Air Units, 1917-1946,
Vol. I
(1961).
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this honorable court." That utterance is a supphcation,
a prayer in which we, the judges, are free to join, but which
we need not recite any more than the students need recite
the New York prayer.
What New York does on the opening of its public
schools is what each House of Congress ' does at the open
ing of each day's business.* Reverend Frederick B. Harris
is Chaplain of the Senate; Reverend Bernard Braskamp
is Chaplain of the House. Guest chaplains of various
denominations also officiate. =
' The New York Legislature follows the same procedure. See, e. g.,
Vol. 1, N. Y. Assembly Jour., 184th Sess., 1961, p. 8; Vol. 1, N. Y.
Senate Jour., 184th Sess., 1961, p. 5.
" Rules of the Senate provide that each calendar day's session shall
open with prayer. See Rule III, Senate Manual, S. Doc. No. 2, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. The same is true of the Rules of the House. See
Rule VII, Rules of the House of Representatives, H. R. Doc. No.
459, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. The Chaplains of the Senate and of the
House receive $8,810 annually. See 75 Stat. 320, 324.
5 It would, I assume, make no difference in the present case if a
different prayer were said every day or if the ministers of the com
munity rotated, each giving his own prayer. For some of the peti
tioners in the present case profess no religion.
The Pledge of Allegiance, like the prayer, recognizes the existence
of a Supreme Being. Since 1954 it has contained the words "one
nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." 36
U. S. C. 172. The House Report, recommending the addition of
the words "under God" stated that those words in no way run
contrary to the First Amendment but recognize "only the guidance
of God in our national affairs." H. R. Rep. No. 1693, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess., p. 3. And see S. Rep. No. 1287, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. Sen
ator Ferguson, who sponsored the measure in the Senate, pointed out
that the words "In God We Trust" are over the entrance to the
Senate Chamber. 100 Cong. Rec. 6348. He added:
"I have felt that the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag which stands
for the United States of America should recognize the Creator who
we really believe is in control of the destinies of this great Republic.
"It is true that under the Constitution no power is lodged anywhere
to establish a religion. This is not an attempt to establish a religion ;
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In New York the teacher who leads in prayer is on the
public payroll ; and the time she takes seems minuscule as
compared with the salaries appropriated by state legisla
tures and Congress for chaplains to conduct prayers in the
legislative halls. Only a bare fraction of the teacher's
time is given to reciting this short 22-word prayer,
about the same amount of time that our Marshal spends
it has nothing to do with anything of that kind. It relates to belief
in God, in whom we sincerely repose our trust. We know that Amer
ica cannot be defended by guns, planes, and ships alone. Appro
priations and expenditures for defense will be of value only if the
God under whom we live believes that we are in the right. We
should at all times recognize God's province over the lives of our
people and over this great Nation." Ibid. And see 100 Cong. Rec.
7757 et seq. for the debates in the House.
The Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 517, 518, authorized the phrase
"In God We Trust" to be placed on coins. And see 17 Stat. 427.
The first mandatory requirement for the use of that motto on coins
was made by the Act of May 18, 1908, 35 Stat. 164. See H. R. Rep.
No. 1106, 60th Cong., 1st Sess.; 42 Cong. Rec. 3384 et seq. The use
of the motto on all currency and coins was directed by the Act of July
11, 1955, 69 Stat. 290. See H. R. Rep, No. 662, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. ;
S. Rep. No. 637, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. Moreover, by the Joint Reso
lution of July 30, 1956, our national motto was declared to be "In God
We Trust." 70 Stat. 732. In reporting the Joint Resolution, the
Senate Judiciary Committee stated:
"Further official recognition of this motto was given by the adoption
of the Star-Spangled Banner as our national anthem. One stanza
of our national anthem is as follows:
'0, thus be it ever when freemen shall stand
Between their lov'd home and the war's desolation:
Blest with vict'ry and peace may the heav'n rescued land
Praise the power that hath made and preserved us a nation!
Then conquer we must when our cause
it is just.
And this be our motto�"In God is our trust."
And the Star-Spangled Banner in triumph shall wave
O'er the land of the free and the home of
the brave.
"In view of these words in our national anthem,
it is clear that In
God we trust' has a strong claim as our
national motto. S. Kep.
No. 2703, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2.
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announcing the opening of our sessions and offering a
prayer for this Court. Yet for me the principle is the
same, no matter how briefly the prayer is said, for in
each of the instances given the person praying is a public
official on the public payroll, performing a rehgious exer
cise in a governmental institution. � It is said that the
element of coercion is inherent in the giving of this prayer.
If that is true here, it is also true of the prayer with which
this Court is convened, and with those that open the
Congress. Few adults, let alone children, would leave
our courtroom or the Senate or the House while those
prayers are being given. Every such audience is in a
sense a "captive" audience.
At the same time I cannot say that to authorize this
prayer is to establish a religion in the strictly historic
meaning of those words.' A religion is not established
in the usual sense merely by letting those who chose to
do so say the prayer that the public school teacher leads.
Yet once government finances a religious exercise it
inserts a divisive influence into our communities." The
^ The fact that taxpayers do not have standing in the federal courts
to raise the issue (Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447) is of course
no justification for drawing a line between what is done in New
York on one hand and on the other what we do and what Congress
does in this matter of prayer.
' The Court analogizes the present case to those involving the
traditional Established Church. We once had an Established Church,
the Anglican. All baptisms and marriages had to take place there.
That church was supported by taxation. In these and other ways
the Anglican Church was favored over the others. The First Amend
ment put an end to placing any one church in a preferred position.
It ended support of any church or all churches by taxation. It went
further and prevented secular sanction to any religious ceremony,
dogma, or rite. Thus, it prevents civil penalties from being applied
against recalcitrants or nonconformists.
� Some communities, including Washington, D. C, have a Christ
mas tree purchased with the taxpayers' money. The tree is sometimes
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New York court said that the prayer given does not con
form to all of the tenets of the Jewish, Unitarian, and
Ethical Culture groups. One of petitioners is an agnostic.
"We are a religious people whose institutions presup
poses a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S.
306, 313. Under our Bill of Rights free play is given for
making religion an active force in our lives." But "if a
religious leaven is to be worked into the affairs of our
people, it is to be done by individuals and groups, not by
the Government." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S.
420, 563 (dissenting opinion). By reason of the First
Amendment government is commanded "to have no
interest in theology or ritual" (id., at 564), for on those
matters "government must be neutral." Ibid. The
First Amendment leaves the Government in a position
not of hostility to religion but of neutrality. The
philosophy is that the atheist or agnostic�the nonbe-
liever�is entitled to go his own way. The philosophy
is that if government interferes in matters spiritual, it will
be a divisive force. The First Amendment teaches that
a government neutral in the field of religion better serves
all religious interests.
My problem today would be uncomplicated but for
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 17, which
allowed taxpayers' money to be used to pay "the bus fares
of parochial school pupils as a part of a general program
decorated with the words "Peace on earth, goodwill to men." At
other times the authorities draw from a different version of the Bible
which says "Peace on earth to men of goodwill." Christmas, I
suppose, is still a religious celebration, not merely a day put
on the
calendar for the benefit of merchants.
0 Religion was once deemed to be a function of the pubhc
school
system The Northwest Ordinance, which
antedated the First Amend
ment provided in Article 3 that "Religion, morality, and knowledge
being' necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind,
schools and the means of education shaU forever be encouraged."
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under which" the fares of pupils attending public and
other schools were also paid. The Everson case seems in
retrospect to be out of line with the First Amendment.
Its result is appealing, as it allows aid to be given to needy
children. Yet by the same token, public funds could be
used to satisfy other needs of children in parochial
schools�lunches, books, and tuition being obvious
examples. Mr. Justice Rutledge stated in dissent what
I think is durable First Amendment philosophy:
"The reasons underlying the Amendment's policy
have not vanished with time or diminished in force.
Now as when it was adopted the price of religious
freedom is double. It is that the church and religion
shall live both within and upon that freedom. There
cannot be freedom of religion, safeguarded by the
state, and intervention by the church or its agencies
in the state's domain or dependency on its largesse.
Madison's Remonstrance, Par. 6, 8. The great con
dition of religious liberty is that it be maintained free
from sustenance, as also from other interferences, by
the state. For when it comes to rest upon that
secular foundation it vanishes with the resting. Id.,
Par. 7, 8. Public money devoted to payment of
religious costs, educational or other, brings the quest
for more. It brings too the struggle of sect against
sect for the larger share or for any. Here one by
numbers alone will benefit most, there another.
That is precisely the history of societies which have
had an established religion and dissident groups. Id.
Par. 8, U . It is the very thing Jefferson and Madison
experienced and sought to guard against, whether in
its blunt or in its more screened forms. Ibid. The
end of such strife cannot be other than to destroy
the cherished liberty. The dominating group will
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achieve the dominant benefit; or all will embroil the
state in their dissensions. Id. Par. 11." Id., pp.
53-54.
What New York does with this prayer is a break with
that tradition. I therefore join the Court in reversing the
judgment below.
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Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting.
A local school board in New York has provided that
those pupils who wish to do so may join in a brief prayer
at the beginning of each school day, acknowledging their
dependence upon God and asking His blessing upon them
and upon their parents, their teachers, and their country.
The Court today decides that in permitting this brief non-
denominational prayer the school board has violated the
Constitution of the United States. I think this decision
is wrong.
The Court does not hold, nor could it, that New York
has interfered with the free exercise of anybody's reli
gion. For the state courts have made clear that those
who object to reciting the prayer must be entirely free of
any compulsion to do so, including any "embarrassments
and pressures." Cf. West Virginia State Board of Educa
tion V. Bamette, 319 U. S. 624. But the Court says that
in permitting school children to say this simple prayer,
the New York authorities have established "an official
religion."
With all respect, I think the Court has misapplied a
great constitutional principle. I cannot see how an
"official religion" is established by letting those who want
to say a prayer say it. On the contrary,
I think that to
deny the wish of these school children to join
in recitmg
this prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing
m
the spiritual heritage of our Nation.
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The Court's historical review of the quarrels over the
Book of Common Prayer in England throws no light for
me on the issue before us in this case. England had then
and has now an established church. Equally unenlight-
ening, I think, is the history of the early estabhshment
and later rejection of an official church in our own States.
For we deal here not with the establishment of a state
church, which would, of course, be constitutionally imper
missible, but with whether school children who want to
begin their day by joining in prayer must be prohibited
from doing so. Moreover, I think that the Court's task,
in this as in all areas of constitutional adjudication, is not
responsibly aided by the uncritical invocation of meta
phors like the "wall of separation," a phrase nowhere to
be found in the Constitution. What is relevant to the
issue here is not the history of an established church in
sixteenth century England or in eighteenth century
America, but the history of the religious traditions of our
people, reflected in countless practices of the institutions
and officials of our government.
At the opening of each day's Session of this Court we
stand, while one of our officials invokes the protection of
God. Since the days of John Marshall our Crier has said,
"God save the United States and this Honorable Court." '
Both the Senate and the House of Representatives open
their daily Sessions with prayer.' Each of our Presidents,
from George Washington to John F. Kennedy, has upon
assuming his Office asked the protection and help of God.'
� See Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, Vol. 1,
p. 469.
2 See Rule IH, Senate Manual, S. Doc. No. 2, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
See Rule VH, Rules of the House of Representatives, H. R. Doc. No.
459, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
' For example :
On April 30, 1789, President George Washington said:
". . . it would be peculiarly improper to omit in this first
official act my fervent supplications to that Aknighty Being who
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rules over the universe, who presides in the councils of nations,
and whose providential aids can supply every human defect, that
His benediction may consecrate to the liberties and happiness of
the people of the United States a Government instituted by
themselves for these essential purposes, and may enable every
instrument employed in its administration to execute with suc
cess the functions allotted to His charge. In tendering this hom
age to the Great Author of every public and private good, I assure
myself that it expresses your sentiments not less than my own,
nor those of my fellow-citizens at large less than either. No
people can be bound to acknowledge and adore the Invisible
Hand which conducts the affairs of men more than those of the
United States.
"Having thus imparted to you my sentiments as they have
been awakened by the occasion which brings us together, I shall
take my present leave; but not without resorting once more to
the benign Parent of the Human Race in humble supplication
that, since He has been pleased to favor the American people
with opportunities for deliberating in perfect tranquiUity, and
dispositions for deciding with unparalleled unanimity on a form
of goverimient for the security of their union and the advance
ment of their happiness, so His divine blessing may be equally
conspicuous in the enlarged views, the temperate consultations,
and the wise measures on which the success of this Government
must depend."
On March 4, 1797, President John Adams said:
"And may that Being who is supreme over all, the Patron of
Order, the Fountain of Justice, and the Protector in all ages
of the world of virtuous liberty, continue His blessing upon this
nation and its Government and give it all possible success and
duration consistent with the ends of His providence."
On March 4, 1805, President Thomas Jefferson said:
"I shall need, too, the favor of that Being in whose hands we
are, who led our fathers, as Israel of old, from
their native land
and planted them in a country flowing with all the necessaries
and comforts of hfe; who has covered our infancy with His
providence and our riper years with His wisdom
and power, and
to whose goodness I ask you to join in supphcations
with me
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that He will so enlighten the minds of your servants, guide their
councils, and prosper their measures that whatsoever they do
shall result in your good, and shall secure to you the peace,
friendship, and approbation of all nations."
On March 4, 1809, President James Madison said:
"But the source to which I look . . . is in . . . my feUow-
citizens, and in the counsels of those representing them in the
other departments associated in the care of the national interests.
In these my confidence will under every difficulty be best placed,
next to that which we have all been encouraged to feel in the
guardianship and guidance of that Almighty Being whose power
regulates the destiny of nations, whose blessings have been so
conspicuously dispensed to this rising Repubhc, and to whom
we are bound to address our devout gratitude for the past, as
well as our fervent supphcations and best hopes for the future."
On March 4, 1865, President Abraham Lincoln said:
"Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty
scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that
it continue until aU the wealth piled by the bondsman's two
hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and
until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by
another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years
ago, so still it must be said 'the judgments of the Lord are true
and righteous altogether.'
"With mahce toward none, with charity for all, with firmness
in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to
finish the work we are in, to bind up the nation's wounds, to
care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his widow
and his orphan, to do all which may achieve and cherish a just
and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations."
On March 4, 1885, President Grover Cleveland said:
"And let us not trust to human effort alone, but humbly
acknowledging the power and goodness of Almighty God, who
presides over the destiny of nations, and who has at all times
been revealed in our country's history, let us invoke His aid and
His blessing upon our labors."
On March 5, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson said:
"I pray God I may be given the wisdom and the prudence to
do my duty in the true spirit of this great people."
[Footnote S continued on p. 5]
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The Court today says that the state and federal gov
ernments are without constitutional power to prescribe
any particular form of words to be recited by any group
of the American people on any subject touching religion.*
The third stanza of "The Star-Spangled Banner," made
our National Anthem by Act of Congress in 1931,= contains
these verses:
"Blest with victory and peace, may the heav'n
rescued land
Praise the Pow'r that hath made and preserved
us a nation !
Then conquer we must, when our cause it is just.
And this be our motto 'In God is our Trust.'
"
In 1954 Congress added a phrase to the Pledge of Alle
giance to the Flag so that it now contains the words "one
Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice
On March 4, 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt said:
"In this dedication of a Nation we humbly ask the blessing
of God. May He protect each and every one of us. May He
guide me in the days to come."
On January 21, 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower said:
"Before all else, we seek, upon our common labor as a nation,
the blessings of Almighty God. And the hopes in our hearts
fashion the deepest prayers of our whole people."
On January 20, 1961, President John F. Kennedy said:
"The world is very different now. . . . And yet the same
revolutionary behefs for which our forebears fought are still at
issue around the globe�the belief that the rights of man come
not from the generosity of the state, but from the hand of God.
"With a good conscience our only sure reward, with history
the
final judge of our deeds, let us go forth to
lead the land we lo^�e,
asking His blessing and His help,
but knowing that here on earth
God's work must truly be our own." . ^ ,
4Mv brother Douglas says that the only question
before us is
whether government "can constitutionally
finance a religious exer-
le " The official chaplains of Congress are paid with public money.
So are military chaplains. So are
state and federal prison chaplains,
6 36 U, S. C. �170.
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for all." " In 1952 Congress enacted legislation calling
upon the President each year to proclaim a National Day
of Prayer.' Since 1865 the words "in god we trust"
have been impressed on our coins."
Countless similar examples could be listed, but there is
no need to belabor the obvious." It was all summed up
by this Court just ten years ago in a single sentence: "We
are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 313.
I do not believe that this Court, or the Congress, or the
President has by the actions and practices I have men
tioned established an "official religion" in violation of the
Constitution. And I do not believe the State of New York
has done so in this case. What each has done has been
to recognizfe and to follow the deeply entrenched and
highly cherished spiritual traditions of our Nation�
traditions which come down to us from those who almost
two hundred years ago avowed their "firm reliance on the
Protection of Divine Providence" when they proclaimed
the freedom and independence of this brave new world."
I dissent.
" 36 U. S. C. � 172. ' 36 U. S. C. � 185.
8 13 Stat. 517, 518; 17 Stat. 427; 35 Stat. 164; 69 Stat. 290. The
current provisions are embodied in 31 U. S. C. �� 324, 324a.
" I am at a loss to understand the Court's unsupported ipse dixit
that these official expressions of rehgious faith in and reliance upon a
Supreme Being "bear no true resemblance to the unquestioned reli
gious exercise that the State of New York has sponsored in this
instance." See p. , supra, n. 21. I can hardly think that the
Court means to say that the First Amendment imposes a lesser
restriction upon the Federal Government than does the Fourteenth
Amendment upon the States. Or is the Court suggesting that the
Constitution permits judges and Congressmen and Presidents to join
in prayer, but prohibits school children from doing so?
"The Declaration of Independence ends with this sentence: "And
for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the Pro
tection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our
Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor."
